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In the past quarter century, the Supreme Court has legitimated agency authority to interpret 
regulatory legislation, above all in Chevron U.S.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
the most cited case in modern public law. Chevron recognizes that the resolution of statutory am-
biguities often requires judgments of policy; its call for judicial deference to reasonable interpreta-
tions was widely expected to have eliminated the role of policy judgments in judicial review of 
agency interpretations of law. But this expectation has not been realized. On the Supreme Court, 
conservative justices vote to validate agency decisions less often than liberal justices. Moreover, the 
most conservative members of the Supreme Court show significantly increased validation of 
agency interpretations after President Bush succeeded President Clinton, and the least conservative 
members of the Court show significantly decreased validation rates in the same period. In a similar 
vein, the most conservative members of the Court are less likely to validate liberal agency interpre-
tations than conservative ones, and the least conservative members of the Court show the opposite 
pattern.  
Similar patterns can be found on federal appellate courts. In lower court decisions involving 
the EPA and the NLRB from 1990 to 2004, Republican appointees demonstrated a greater will-
ingness to invalidate liberal agency decisions and those of Democratic administrations. These 
differences are greatly amplified when Republican appointees sit with two Republican appointees 
and when Democratic appointees sit with two Democratic appointees.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years ago, the Supreme Court decided Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
1 one of the most 
important rulings in the past quarter century in American public law.
2
Chevron famously established a two-step inquiry for courts to follow 
in reviewing agency interpretations of law.
3 The first step asks “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” an in-
quiry that requires an assessment of whether Congress’s intent “is 
clear” and “unambiguously expressed.”
4 The second step asks whether 
the agency’s interpretation is “permissible,” which is to say reasonable 
in light of the underlying law.
5
This two-step approach appears to call for a large degree of judi-
cial deference to agency interpretations, and indeed an early study 
found that the Chevron decision significantly increased the rate of 
judicial deference.
6 For its defenders, Chevron signaled a healthy 
awareness that the resolution of ambiguities calls for judgments of 
policy—and an accompanying belief that such judgments should be 
made by political actors, not by the federal judiciary.
7 An additional 
advantage of the Chevron approach is its potential to reduce variation 
within federal courts of appeals through its simple instruction that 
courts should uphold all reasonable interpretations of ambiguous 
terms.
8 In light of that instruction, different courts of appeals should 
usually reach the same result, permitting agency interpretations so 
long as they are reasonable. And indeed, the leading treatise on the 
topic offers this bold assessment: “Chevron has reduced significantly the 
problem of inconsistent interpretations of agency-administered national 
1  467 US 837 (1984).  
2  As a sign of Chevron’s influence, consider the fact that the decision was cited 2,414 times
in its first decade (between 1984 and January 1, 1994), 2,584 times in its next six years (between 
January 1, 1994, and January 1, 2000), and 2,235 times in its next five years (between January 1, 
2000, and January 28, 2005). LEXIS search, Mar 2006.  
3  See 467 US at 842–44.
4 Id  at  842–43.
5 Id  at  843–44. 
6  See Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study 
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L J 984, 1057–59 (noting that circuit courts affirmed 
agency decisions at a higher rate after Chevron was decided than before). 
7  See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 3.2–3.4 at 141–48 (Aspen 4th 
ed 2002) (“The Chevron Court did criticize, however, and held unlawful, substitution of judicial 
policy preferences for agency policy preferences where Congress intended to delegate policy-
making to an agency.”). 
8  See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Su-
preme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093, 
1121–22 (1987) (arguing that “the Chevron rule subdues this diversity [of interpretation of am-
biguous statutes by the various circuits], and thus enhances the probability of uniform national 
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statutes. Its effect is to preclude judges from second-guessing agency 
policy decisions by mischaracterizing those decisions as resolutions of 
questions of law.”
9
The purpose of this Article is to explore the role of judicial con-
victions in the application of Chevron. Two data sets are analyzed. The 
first consists of all Supreme Court decisions between 1989 and 2005 
that reviewed agency interpretations of law.
10 This data set consists of 
eighty-four decisions, and we focus on sixty-nine in which the Court 
applied the Chevron framework. In the remaining fifteen decisions, 
the Court reviewed an agency decision but did not expressly apply 
Chevron. In many of these instances, a concurring or dissenting justice 
expressed the belief that the Court should have applied Chevron. Al-
though the number of such decisions is too small to permit a formal 
analysis of the differences between Chevron and what we call “non-
Chevron” decisions, these cases offer hints as to the Court’s willing-
ness to apply Chevron and whether Chevron  makes a difference 
within the Court.  
The second data set includes decisions from the circuit courts of 
appeals, and it contains a substantially larger number of opinions, 253. 
It consists of all published cases from 1990 through 2004 in which fed-
eral judges reviewed interpretations of law by the EPA and the 
NLRB. Of the 253 opinions, 183 involved the EPA, and 70 involved 
the NLRB. Federal circuit judges cast 758 votes in these cases. As in 
the Supreme Court opinions, the circuit courts typically resolved these 
cases by applying Chevron; in only 26 cases did they not apply it. The 
use of two data sets affords the opportunity to evaluate whether the 
Supreme Court and the circuit courts differ in their application of 
Chevron.
The simplest finding is that on both the Supreme Court and the 
courts of appeals, the application of the Chevron framework is greatly 
affected by the judges’ own convictions. Whatever Chevron may say, 
the data reveal a strong relationship between the justices’ ideological 
9 Pierce,  1  Administrative Law § 3.4 at 148 (cited in note 7). 
10  These cases were found by placing Chevron in the relevant databases. Hence we do not 
include any decisions that review agency interpretations of law without reference to Chevron, a 
category that might include decisions in which the Chevron framework was deemed inapplicable, 
and so deemed without discussion. Because Chevron is standardly cited in judicial review of 
agency interpretations of law, even in cases in which its framework does not apply, our method is 
unlikely to produce distortions even if the resulting data set is incomplete.  
  A note on research method: we began by asking research assistants to compile and code the 
cases in order to investigate our various hypotheses. After they produced their initial results, we 
recompiled and recoded the cases ourselves. Our own coding produced some differences in the 
numbers, but the central patterns were the same. See note 32 (discussing our decision to drop the 
data involving the Federal Communications Commission). The data can be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
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predispositions and the probability that they will validate agency de-
terminations. The most conservative justices are 30 percentage points 
more likely to vote to validate agency interpretations that are coded 
as conservative than to validate agency interpretations coded as lib-
eral. By contrast, the more liberal justices are 27 percentage points 
more likely to vote to validate agency interpretations coded as liberal 
than to validate those coded as conservative. Moreover, the most con-
servative justices on the Supreme Court show a validation rate 19 per-
centage points lower when applying the Chevron framework to the 
interpretations of the Clinton administration than to those of the two 
Bush administrations—while the more liberal justices show a valida-
tion rate 6 percentage points higher under the Clinton administration 
than under the two Bush administrations. If judicial decisions under 
the  Chevron framework are assessed in crudely political terms, the 
voting patterns of Supreme Court justices fit with the conventional 
groupings of the justices along political lines—a clear signal that the 
Chevron framework is not having the disciplining effect that it is sup-
posed to have.  
Consider also a remarkable fact: Justice Breyer, the Court’s most 
vocal critic of a strong reading of Chevron,
11 is the most deferential 
justice in practice, while Justice Scalia, the Court’s most vocal Chevron
enthusiast,
12 is the least deferential. Overall, the data show that the 
justices’ validation rates are consistent with common perceptions of 
their political ideology. More liberal justices vote to validate at higher 
rates than more conservative justices. Moreover, it is unclear whether 
Chevron has any effect within the Court. Although the number of 
cases in which the Court did not apply Chevron is small and nonran-
dom, ideological disagreements in cases applying Chevron are as large 
as in cases not applying its two-step analysis. A casual comparison of 
Chevron and non-Chevron cases does not suggest that Chevron suc-
ceeds in dampening the influence of ideology in the Court’s review of 
agency interpretations.  
Within the courts of appeals, the patterns also reveal a strong in-
fluence of political convictions in judicial review of agency interpreta-
tions of law. When the agency decision is liberal, the average Democ-
ratic appointee to the appellate courts is about 14 percentage points 
11  See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev
363, 372–82 (1986) (characterizing the strong reading of Chevron as “seriously overbroad, coun-
terproductive and sometimes senseless”); see also Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting 
Our Democratic Constitution 106–08, 130 (Knopf 2005) (“Deference to a reasonable agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision often makes sense, but not always.”).  
12 See  generally  Antonin  Scalia,  Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
Duke L J511 (defending the Chevron rule on the grounds that it gives effect to congressional intent). 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 827
more likely to vote to validate the agency than the average Republi-
can appointee. But when the agency decision is conservative, this pat-
tern flips, and the average Democratic appointee is 19 percentage 
points less likely to vote to validate the agency decision than the aver-
age Republican appointee. This sharp reversal in validation rates indi-
cates that, despite Chevron, industry groups are more likely to find a 
sympathetic reaction from Republican appointees than from Democ-
ratic appointees. Similarly, public interest groups do better with Democ-
ratic appointees, even under the Chevron framework. Overall, Democ-
ratic appointees are 17 percentage points more likely to vote in a 
stereotypically liberal fashion in Chevron cases than are Republican 
appointees. 
These differences become even more stark when the composition 
of the appellate panels is considered. Perhaps most disturbingly, a De-
mocratic appointee, sitting with two Democratic appointees, is 31.5 
percentage points more likely to vote to uphold a liberal decision than 
a conservative one—and a Republican appointee, sitting with two Re-
publican appointees, is over 40 percentage points more likely to vote 
to uphold a conservative decision than a liberal one. We do not place 
too much emphasis on the precise magnitudes of these differences, 
because the number of observations in the finer decompositions of the 
data is small. However, the role of political judgments in judicial re-
view of agency interpretations of law, at both levels of appellate re-
view, is unmistakable. 
What are the implications of these findings? A full discussion would 
be beyond the scope of the present Article; our emphasis is on the data, 
not on what lessons to draw from it. But it is reasonable to suggest 
that the meaning of federal statutory law should not be based on 
whether a litigant has drawn a panel of judges appointed by a presi-
dent from a particular party—or on whether the Supreme Court is 
dominated by judges of any particular ideological stripe. If this sugges-
tion is accepted, a strong endorsement of the agency’s law-interpreting 
power is the best way to achieve that goal. Whether or not that judg-
ment is ultimately accepted, it is clear that as the law now stands, the 
application of the Chevron framework, and hence the meaning of fed-
eral regulatory law, shows a significant effect from the political convic-
tions of federal judges. 
II. CHEVRON AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. Simple Predictions about the Influence of Chevron
If the goal is to predict how Chevron might operate in practice, it 
is sensible to begin with some hypotheses. Of these, the first and sim-
plest is that Chevron would tend to eliminate systematic differences 
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among judges along political lines. On this view, the consequence of 
the two-step analysis should be to produce relatively uniform valida-
tion rates that do not correlate with the ideology of particular judges. 
We might call this the doctrinal hypothesis, based as it is on the view 
that existing doctrine, as reflected in Chevron, has successfully elimi-
nated ideological differences within the judiciary. 
A second hypothesis is that whatever Chevron says, political con-
victions actually continue to drive judicial review of agency interpreta-
tions of law. On this view, judges’ political preferences influence and 
perhaps even determine how they decide cases. In the context of re-
viewing agency interpretations, this hypothesis suggests that judges 
are more likely to validate when the agency’s conclusion conforms 
with their policy judgments, regardless of whether the statutory text is 
clear or ambiguous. Call this the realist hypothesis.
A third hypothesis emphasizes that the prevailing approach to 
statutory interpretation should influence application of the two-step 
analysis. In recent decades, a prominent approach has relied on the 
“plain meaning” as reflected in the statutory text.
13 As Justice Scalia 
signaled long ago, those who believe that statutes have clear meanings 
will be more likely to invalidate agency action at Chevron Step One.
14
Adherents to this approach should be less likely to validate the agency’s 
interpretation. By contrast, Justice Breyer rejects “plain meaning” ap-
proaches,
15 and he and others who eschew “plain meaning” might well 
be more likely to find textual ambiguity where Justice Scalia finds 
clarity. Those who do not find a “plain meaning” should be more likely 
to reach Chevron Step Two and ultimately to uphold reasonable 
agency interpretations of law.
16
Of course there is no logical or necessary connection between 
adoption of “plain meaning” approaches and being “liberal” or “con-
servative.” But as an empirical matter, the more conservative justices 
(Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas) have embraced “plain 
13  See, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
18–25 (Princeton 1997). 
14  See Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 521 (cited in note 12) (“One who finds more often (as I do) 
that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, 
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.”). 
15 See  Breyer,  Active Liberty at 85–101 (cited in note 11) (arguing that “overemphasis on 
text can lead courts astray, divorcing law from life,” and advocating “a purposive approach” to 
statutory interpretation). 
16  It is possible, of course, that those who reject “plain meaning” will turn out to take a 
stronger, rather than weaker, stand against agency interpretations of law because they will em-
phasize legislative history and statutory purpose, both of which could, in principle, overcome 
agency interpretations under Chevron Step One. To describe a testable hypothesis, however, we 
are speculating that textualist judges will be more likely to invalidate agency decisions under that 
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meaning” approaches and the more liberal justices have not. We might 
therefore hypothesize that the more textualist members of the Court, 
who also are more conservative, will be more willing to invalidate 
agency action on textual grounds under Step One. The less textualist 
members of the Court, who are more likely to find ambiguity, will be 
more inclined to affirm the agency action on reasonableness grounds. 
Call this the formalist hypothesis.
It is worth noting that the realist hypothesis on the one hand and 
the doctrinal and formalist hypotheses on the other have much in 
common with the two canonical models of judicial behavior in political 
science: the “attitudinal model” and the “legal model.” The political sci-
ence models seek to explain judicial behavior generally rather than in 
the specific context of review of agency action. In the “attitudinal 
model,” a judge seeks to match a case’s outcome to her own policy 
preferences, and she is largely able to do so.
17 In the “legal model,” by 
contrast, judges render decisions without reference to their own policy 
preferences, relying instead on the facts of the case, stare decisis, and 
relevant statutory provisions.
18 A central difference between the “legal 
model” of political science and the doctrinal and formalist hypotheses 
we describe is that the latter identify Chevron and “plain meaning” as 
the operative mechanisms, rather than relying, as the “legal model” does, 
on generic notions of law.
A natural test of the doctrinal, realist, and formalist hypotheses 
would be to correlate the validation rates of judges in Chevron cases 
with the political leanings or interpretive approach of the judges.
19 The 
immediate difficulty with this test is that judges who favor “plain 
meaning” are also politically conservative. Thus, the observation that 
“plain meaning” judges validate at lower rates would be equivalent to 
the observation that politically conservative judges validate at lower 
rates. Would the lower validation rates of these judges be attributable 
to their predilections or their approach?  
To answer this question, and to test the competing hypotheses, we 
examine variations in the political or ideological content of the agency 
decisions. According to the doctrinal hypothesis, the probability that a 
judge votes to validate the agency should bear little relationship to the 
17  The literature on the attitudinal model is large. For an example, see Saul Brenner and 
Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946–1992
59–71 (Cambridge 1995). 
18  See, for example, id at 72–88 (discussing and testing the legal model in stare decisis cases). 
19  There is a fourth hypothesis, which we might call the bureaucratic hypothesis, to the 
effect that some justices would be more inclined to uphold agency decisions than others, what-
ever the ideological content of those decisions. We shall say a few words about this hypothesis 
below. We bracket it here to avoid undue complexity. 
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ideological content of the agency decision. The same is true of the 
formalist hypothesis. The essential test of “plain meaning”—whether a 
statute’s meaning is clear or ambiguous—should be independent of the 
ideological content of the agency interpretation.  
The realist hypothesis offers a different prediction. In this view, 
judges invalidate when the agency decision conflicts with their politi-
cal inclinations and validate when it conforms to those inclinations. 
Specifically, the realist hypothesis predicts, as the formalist alternative 
does not, that validation rates should correlate positively with the po-
litical content of agency decisions. 
To test these predictions, we employ two proxies for the ideologi-
cal content of the agency decisions—proxies that also seem to us of 
independent interest. The first proxy is simply whether the case was 
decided during a Democratic or Republican administration. For pur-
poses of evaluating the ideological content of a judicial decision, it 
surely matters, as a general rule, whether the court is reviewing a deci-
sion under President Clinton or instead President George W. Bush. A 
natural objection to this measure is that litigation challenging agency 
decisions often consumes years. If the litigation spans two administra-
tions, this proxy may incorrectly attribute an agency position to Presi-
dent Bush that was actually adopted under President Clinton. But this 
objection should not be overstated. For purposes of assessing the vari-
ous hypotheses, it is important to identify the administration that is 
actually defending the regulation that is being challenged. Moreover, 
the concern about this measure is mitigated by the ability of a new ad-
ministration to change the agency position and to settle litigation any 
time before the court renders its decision.
20 Note also that we calcu-
lated a two year “lag” on presidential years, to take account of the possi-
bility that presidents would be defending regulations of their predeces-
sors. Under this variation, we obtained our same basic results.
21
The second measure codes an agency decision as “liberal,” simply 
and crudely, by reference to the identity of the party challenging it. If 
an industry group or corporation challenges an agency decision, we 
code the decision as “liberal,” not in the abstract, but for the purpose 
of assessing the legal issue involved in the case. We use this coding 
technique on the theory that if an industry is challenging a decision by 
the EPA, or if a company is challenging a decision by the NLRB, the 
agency’s decision is likely to be perceived as liberal in the context of 
judicial review. If a public interest group or labor union challenges an 
20  Another caveat is that the relatively short time period studied, 1989–2005, encompasses 
only one Democratic administration, the Clinton administration. However, for clarity we gener-
ally refer to the presidencies as Democratic or Republican. 
21 Data available from the authors.2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 831
agency decision, we code the decision as conservative, at least for that 
purpose. The advantage of this method of coding decisions is its me-
chanical and objective character. The disadvantage is its crudeness. In 
a small number of instances, we deviated from the coding rule when it 
produced an obvious error.
22
B. Supreme Court Review in Chevron Cases 
1. Basic data.  
Table 1 presents numbers that provide an initial assessment of the 
three hypotheses for Supreme Court justices. It reports validation rates 
in Chevron cases by justice, and it demonstrates that Chevron does not 
come close to equalizing the validation rates of the justices. Hence, the 
doctrinal hypothesis is inconsistent with the data. As both the formal-
ist and realist accounts predict, the identity of the justice correlates 
with the likelihood of validation of the agency decision.  
Column (1) shows that the overall validation rates vary by as many 
as 30 percentage points across the justices. Of the nine justices, Justices 
Breyer and Souter have the highest validation rates, at 81.8 percent 
and 77 percent, respectively. In contrast, Justices Thomas and Scalia, at 
52.2 percent and 53.6 percent, respectively, have the lowest validation 
rates in Chevron cases. Although the sample sizes are relatively small, 
the difference in validation rates between Justices Scalia and Breyer is 
statistically significant, as is the difference between Justices Scalia and 
Souter. Similarly, Justice Thomas’s validation rate is statistically differ-
ent from those of Justices Breyer and Souter.  
Note, however, that many of the differences are insignificant at 
the statistical level. For example, the apparently large gap in validation 
rates between Justice Rehnquist on the one hand and Justices Scalia 
and Thomas on the other—more than 10 percentage points—is not 
statistically significant. Taken as a whole, the evidence in column (1), 
while repudiating the doctrinal hypothesis, is largely consistent with 
both the realist and formalist hypotheses; conservative and “plain mean-
ing” justices tend to validate the agency decision less often than justices 
who are liberal or do not subscribe to the “plain meaning” approach.  
22  For example, some public interest groups that challenged agency decisions, such as Focus 
on the Family, were clearly not liberal, and cases had to be coded accordingly. 
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TABLE 1 
Validation Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices in  
Chevron Cases: Total and by Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
Ideological Content  
of Agency Decision  Party of Current President 
Justice 
Total 
(1) 
Liberal 
(2) 
Not
Liberal 
(3) 
Difference 
of  
(2)–(3): 
Democrat 
(4) 
Republican 
(5) 
Difference  
of  
(4)–(5): 
Stevens .710 
(.055) 
[69] 
.860 
(.053) 
[43] 
.462 
(.100) 
[26] 
.399** 
(.103) 
.806 
(.072) 
[31] 
.632 
(.079) 
[38] 
.175 
(.109) 
Souter .770 
(.054) 
[61] 
.821 
(.062) 
[39] 
.682 
(.102) 
[22] 
.139 
(.113) 
.774 
(.076) 
[31] 
.767 
(.079) 
[30] 
.008 
(.110) 
Breyer .818 
(.059) 
[44] 
.900 
(.056) 
[30] 
.643 
(.133) 
[14] 
.257** 
(.129) 
.833 
(.078) 
[24] 
.800 
(.092) 
[20] 
.033 
(.119) 
Ginsburg .740 
(.063) 
[50] 
0.818 
(.068) 
[33] 
.588 
(.123) 
[17] 
.230* 
(.129) 
.724 
(.084) 
[29] 
.762 
(.095) 
[21] 
-.038 
(.128) 
O’Connor .677 
(.058) 
[65] 
.625 
(.078) 
[40] 
.760 
(.087) 
[25] 
-.135 
(.120) 
.655 
(.090) 
[29] 
.694 
(.078) 
[36] 
-.039 
(.118) 
Kennedy .672 
(.058) 
[67] 
.667 
(.074) 
[42] 
.680 
(.095) 
[25] 
-.013 
(.120) 
.774 
(.076) 
[31] 
.583 
(.083) 
[36] 
.191* 
(.114) 
Rehnquist .638 
(.058) 
[69] 
.558 
(.077) 
[43] 
.769 
(.084) 
[26] 
-.211* 
(.118) 
.516 
(.091) 
[31] 
.737 
(.072) 
[38] 
-.221* 
(.115) 
Scalia .522 
(.061) 
[69] 
.419 
(.076) 
[43] 
.692 
(.092) 
[26] 
-.273** 
(.121) 
.419 
(.090) 
[31] 
.605 
(.080) 
[38] 
-.186 
(.121) 
Thomas .536 
(.067) 
[56] 
.378 
(.081) 
[37] 
.842 
(.086) 
[19] 
-.464** 
(.129) 
.484 
(.091) 
[31] 
.600 
(.100) 
[25] 
-.116 
(.143) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding. 
Although the doctrinal hypothesis cannot stand, we can easily see 
that the ordering of the justices by validation rates largely conforms 
with the standard alignment of justices on the ideological spectrum. 
The justices generally thought to be liberal—Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Breyer, and Ginsburg—have validation rates in excess of 70 percent. 
The justices generally thought to be conservative—Justices Scalia and 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 833
Thomas—have validation rates under 55 percent. The validation rates 
of justices generally thought to be swing voters—Justices O’Connor 
and Kennedy—fall in the middle, at about 67 percent. The dominant 
pattern of column (1) is that justices standardly characterized as lib-
eral have the highest validation rates, while the justices standardly 
characterized as conservative have the lowest validation rates. The 
justice who is most difficult to classify is Chief Justice Rehnquist. The 
level of his overall validation rate, at about 64 percent, suggests that 
he should be grouped with Justices O’Connor and Kennedy. However, 
as the subsequent columns of Table 1 show, Rehnquist’s validation 
rate correlates strongly with the political content of agency action, and 
this pattern makes his validation rate more akin to that of Justices 
Scalia and Thomas rather than that of O’Connor and Kennedy. At the 
same time, it is also striking that the highest validation rate comes from 
the Court’s strongest critic of Chevron (Justice Breyer),
23 whereas the 
lowest validation rate comes from the Court’s strongest Chevron enthu-
siast (Justice Scalia).
24 In view of this finding alone, it would be reason-
able to speculate that a judge’s formal position on the deference princi-
ple matters much less than one might think. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 report the rates at which each jus-
tice validates a liberal agency decision (or, equivalently, rejects a chal-
lenge to an agency decision by an industry group). Columns (4) and 
(5) present similar estimates when the rates are stratified by the party 
of the current president. The Table also reports the differences be-
tween these measures for each justice. Notably, the validation rates of 
some justices, such as Justice O’Connor, are nearly constant across 
administrations, and others, such as Justice Kennedy, are unaffected by 
whether the agency’s decision was liberal. In contrast, the validation 
rates of other justices fluctuate dramatically in accordance with poli-
tics. The validation rates of Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg move 
by more than 20 percentage points when the nature of the agency deci-
sion changes. Similarly, the rates of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas swing by more than 20 percentage points with a switch in the 
political content of the agency decision.  
In Table 1, the validation rates of the conservative justices appear 
more sensitive to the presidential administration. However, as previ-
ously mentioned, our method of identifying administrations—the party 
of the occupant of the White House at the time that the Court issues its 
decision—is somewhat arbitrary. The fact that litigation takes a year or 
23 See  Breyer,  Active Liberty at 106–08, 130 (cited in note 11); Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 
372–82 (cited in note 11).
24  See generally Scalia, 1989 Duke L J 511 (cited in note 12).    
9834 The University of Chicago Law Review [73:823
more to reach the Court suggests an alternative specification of lag-
ging the dates of a change in administration by a year or two. Al-
though we do not report these specifications here to conserve space, 
these alternative specifications show that the more liberal justices ap-
pear as sensitive to the party of the current administration as the more 
conservative justices do. Although the magnitudes exhibit some sensi-
tivity and the small number of observations make statistical signifi-
cance difficult to attain, the role of politics is hard to miss. 
The direction of these movements is largely consistent with con-
ventional wisdom about each justice’s ideological orientation. Justices 
on the conservative wing of the court—Rehnquist, Scalia, and Tho-
mas—validate at higher rates during Republican administrations than 
Democratic administrations. Justices on the liberal wing of the court—
such as Stevens and Ginsburg—validate at much higher rates when 
the agency decision is liberal than when it is not. The validation rates 
of Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor, who typically are cast as 
the moderate or “swing” justices, are less consistently correlated with 
the ideological content of the agency decision.  
2. Evaluating the hypotheses.  
As is readily apparent from these figures, the formalist explana-
tion does not square well with these results, and the realist explana-
tion seems to fare much better. When the agency action is not liberal, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas show signifi-
cant increases in validation rates. When the agency action is liberal, 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens show large increases in 
validation rates. Justice Kennedy’s validation rates show some sensi-
tivity to the party of the current president, but not to the ideological 
content of the agency decision. Justice O’Connor’s validation rates 
display the opposite pattern—some sensitivity to the political content 
of the agency decision but not to the administration.  
It is usual to sort the justices into three groups: the conservatives 
(Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, or RST); the swing votes (O’Connor 
and Kennedy, or OK); and the liberals (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, or SSGB). To obtain a better test of the competing hypothesis, 
we aggregate the justices into these three widely acknowledged groups. 
The data themselves provide some justification for these groupings. The 
RST group features a validation rate of about 57 percent, the OK group 
one of 67 percent, and the SSBG group one of 75 percent. The differ-
ence in rates between the SSBG group and the RST group is statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level. Tables 2 and 3 report these fig-2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 835
ures as well as validation rates by the ideological nature of the agency 
decision and by presidential administration, respectively.
25
TABLE 2 
Validation Rates of Groups of Supreme Court Justices in Chevron
Cases: Total and by Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
Justice 
Total 
(1) 
Liberal 
(2) 
Not Liberal 
(3) 
Difference 
of (2)–(3): 
Stevens, Souter, Breyer & Ginsburg  .754 
(.029) 
[224] 
.848 
(.030) 
[145] 
.582 
(.056) 
[79] 
.266** 
(.058) 
O’Connor & Kennedy  .674 
(.041) 
[132] 
.646 
(.053) 
[82] 
.720 
(.064) 
[50] 
-.074 
(.084) 
Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas  .567 
(.036) 
[194] 
.455 
(.045) 
[123] 
.761 
(.051) 
[71] 
-.305** 
(.071) 
Difference of SSBG–OK  .080* 
(.049) 
.202** 
(.056) 
-.138 
(.087) 
--
Difference of SSBG–RST  .187** 
(.045) 
.393** 
(.053) 
-.178** 
(.076) 
--
Difference of OK–RST  .107* 
(.055) 
.191** 
(.070) 
-.041 
(.081) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
Tables 2 and 3 show more concisely what was already apparent in 
Table 1: the validation rates of the SSBG and RST groups correlate 
with the ideological content of agency decisions. Table 2 shows that the 
validation rates of SSBG move by more than 25 percentage points, a 
statistically significant difference, and those of the RST group move by 
more than 30 percentage points. Table 3 reports that when the party of 
the current president is used as the measure of the political content of the 
agency interpretation, these differences are about 6 percentage points for 
the SSBG group and 18 percentage points for the RST group. Both of 
these movements are in the expected direction.  
25  Appendix Tables 1.A through 1.I report further details on the validation rates of the 
individual justices. 
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TABLE 3 
Validation Rates of Groups of Supreme Court Justices in  
Chevron Cases: Total and by Party of Current President 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Party of Current President 
Justice 
Total 
(1) 
Democratic 
(2) 
Republican 
(3) 
Difference 
of (2)–(3): 
Stevens, Souter, Breyer & Ginsburg  .754 
(.029) 
[224] 
.783 
(.038) 
[115] 
.725 
(.043) 
[109] 
.058 
(.058) 
O’Connor & Kennedy  .674 
(.041) 
[132] 
.717 
(.059) 
[60] 
.639 
(.057) 
[72] 
.078 
(.082) 
Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas  .567 
(.036) 
[194] 
.473 
(.052) 
[93] 
.653 
(.048) 
[101] 
-.180** 
(.070) 
Difference of SSBG–OK  .080 
(.049) 
.066 
(.068) 
.086 
(.070) 
--
Difference of SSBG–RST  .187** 
(.049) 
.309** 
(.064) 
.071 
(.064) 
--
Difference of OK–RST  .107* 
(.055) 
.243** 
(.080) 
-.015 
(.074) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
These movements also show that it is not easy to conclude that 
one wing of the Court is more responsive to the politics of a case than 
the other wing. In Table 2, when the cases are stratified according to 
whether the agency decision was liberal, the fluctuations in the valida-
tion rates of the RST and SSBG groups are similar in magnitudes; but 
in Table 3, when the cases are grouped by party of the current presi-
dent, the RST group exhibits a larger movement. Moreover, the mag-
nitudes of these differences—30.5 versus 26.6 percentage points, and 
18 versus 5.8 percentage points—are not so large as to make these 
differences statistically different from each other. 
At the same time, Tables 2 and 3 consistently show that liberal 
judges validate at higher rates when the agency decision is liberal rather 
than conservative, and the reverse is true for conservative justices. By 
comparison, in both Table 2 and 3, the validation rate of the OK group 
shows only modest movements. For each measure, the difference in 
the validation rates of the OK group is less than 10 percentage points, 
and neither is statistically significant.  2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 837
3. Qualified realism.  
The figures in these initial tables provide some support for the 
realist explanation, but they are not an unqualified confirmation of it. 
A strong version of the realist view would predict that conservative 
justices should exhibit high validation rates under Bush and low rates 
under Clinton—and the converse should be true for liberal justices. 
Committed realists might also be inclined to predict symmetry be-
tween conservative and liberal justices. When conservative justices re-
view agency decisions that match their policy preferences, they should 
validate at rates just as high as the validation rates of liberal justices 
when the latter encounter agency decisions that match their policy 
preferences. Similarly, the validation rates of conservative justices 
should be just as low as those of liberal justices when they face agency 
interpretations contrary to their political leanings. In effect, the valida-
tion rates of conservative and liberal justices should simply switch levels 
depending on whether the agency interpretation matches their policy 
preferences. 
The tables do not consistently establish this simple pattern, but 
Table 2 provides the strongest support for it. The likelihood that the 
SSBG group validates an agency decision is more than 25 percentage 
points higher when that decision is liberal, and the opposite is true for 
the RST group. The validation rate of the OK group shows little move-
ment depending on the ideological content of the agency decision. To 
put it differently, the validation rates of the three groups of justices in 
Table 2 rank according to whether the political content of the agency 
decision is closest to the justices’ ideological preferences.  
The estimates in Table 3, however, do not lend themselves as eas-
ily to a realist interpretation. Those figures show that the validation 
rates of the SSBG group are less responsive to the current administra-
tion and are everywhere higher than the validation rate of the RST 
group. As described above, the estimates by administration are sensi-
tive to how we define presidential administrations, but if taken at face 
value, the estimates in Table 3 are not wholly consistent with the sim-
plest version of realism. Thus, the strong version of the realist hy-
pothesis—that liberal and conservative justices will have validation 
rates that are mirror images of each other—does not find support in 
Table 3. 
The absence of a symmetrical pattern of seesawing validation 
rates in Table 3 suggests that the realist model requires enrichment, or 
the formalist model retains some relevance, or both. The first possibil-
ity is that the formalist account might have some continuing vitality. 
Although the validation rates of the RST group fluctuate with the 
administration—in contradiction of the simple version of the formalist 
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model—their validation rates in Table 3 never exceed those of the 
SSBG group. This finding seems to support the formalist account, be-
cause it is consistent with the hypothesis that the followers of the “plain 
meaning” approach are more likely to conclude a text is unambiguous 
and to forgo validation of the agency.
26
The second possibility is that a more fully articulated realist model 
might also be consistent with these results. Liberal judges are generally 
thought to be more deferential to administrative expertise and regula-
tory judgment—a theme that runs throughout Justice Breyer’s writ-
ing.
27 This view reflects a faith in the expertise and political account-
ability of agencies, and this faith is likely to motivate judges to validate 
agencies, even when they render decisions at odds with a justice’s own 
policy preference. Call this the bureaucratic hypothesis, one that would 
predict a higher rate of validation by the liberal justices simply be-
cause they are more receptive to the exercise of discretion by regula-
tory institutions, regardless of their ideological valence.  
The data do not permit us to distinguish clearly the role of “plain 
meaning” approaches, variations in trust in bureaucracies, and pure 
political preferences. Indeed, it is difficult to envision data that would 
permit precise measurement of these influences. However, the data 
offer some support for each explanation. First and perhaps most im-
portant, the realist model receives clear support from the finding that 
probabilities of validation on the opposing wings of the Court corre-
late with whether the agency decision is liberal. Second, the “plain 
meaning” methodology reduces the likelihood that its followers at any 
time will vote to validate. The prediction of this account is that sub-
scription to the “plain meaning” approach will bias downward the vali-
dation rates of its followers. Consistent with this prediction, the RST 
group has an overall rate of validation lower than those of the other 
justices.
28 Third, belief in bureaucratic competence should increase the 
26   To explore further the importance of the “plain meaning” approach, we examined the 
decisions in which the Court under Chevron invalidated the agency interpretation and asked 
whether particular groups of justices were more likely to invalidate under Step One or Step Two. 
We found no substantial differences between the groups of justices in their likelihood of employ-
ing Step One or Step Two to invalidate. More than 90 percent of invalidations under Chevron
occurred under Step One. 
27  See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 61–63 
(Harvard 1993) (discussing the bureaucratic virtues of rationalization, expertise, insulation, and 
authority). 
28  We recognize that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not subscribe to the “plain meaning” 
approach nearly as clearly as Justices Scalia and Thomas do. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist’s overall 
deference rate—64 percent—is well above that of Justices Scalia and Thomas—54 percent. How-
ever, when Justice Rehnquist’s deference rate is compared to those of all eight other justices, we 
believe that it is reasonable for purposes of this analysis to group him with Justices Scalia and 
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likelihood that justices will vote to validate the agency at all times. 
Consistent with this prediction, the SSBG group has an overall rate of 
validation as least at high as those of the other justices.  
4. An objection.  
A possible objection to these findings is that they fail to control 
for other factors influencing the justices’ conclusions. For example, 
one hypothesis could be that the willingness of justices to validate an 
agency may have changed with the passage of time since Chevron, per-
haps because the justices have grown accustomed to exercising defer-
ence or to applying the Chevron steps. Similarly, an examination of 
aggregate validation rates does not control for the characteristics of 
the cases, such as which agency is involved, the quality of the lawyers’ 
advocacy, the degree to which the particular challengers are sympa-
thetic, the willingness of parties to appeal agency decisions, and other 
differences. If such differences vary systematically with the likelihood 
that the justices vote to validate, and especially if they correlate with 
the political content of the cases, the estimates may be biased. A fail-
ure to control for such differences could therefore lead to improper 
inferences about the role of politics in Chevron analysis.  
To explore the robustness of the estimates to other potential in-
fluences on the likelihood that a justice validates, we conducted a re-
gression analysis. Although the regressions did not permit us to ac-
count for selection effects, they allowed us to employ crude controls 
for some possibly confounding factors. Two sets of controls or addi-
tional explanatory variables were included in the regressions. First, 
indicator variables for each year, or so-called year fixed effects, con-
trolled for any trends over time in the probability that a justice votes 
to validate. Second, indicator variables for each case held constant any 
variation across cases in the likelihood that a justice validates. The 
resulting estimates were remarkably similar to the summary statistics. 
When the agency decision is liberal or the president is a Democrat, the 
SSBG and RST groups have validation rates that are significantly 
higher and lower, respectively, than the OK group. But when the agency 
decision is not liberal or the president is a Republican, the validation 
rates of the three groups of justices are indistinguishable. As the re-
gression analysis adds little to our analysis thus far, we do not report 
the regression results separately here.
29
The analysis here has been somewhat complex, and it will be use-
ful to emphasize some of our principal findings by way of conclusion. 
29  A more detailed description of the functional forms and specifications employed, as well 
as the regression estimates themselves, are available from the authors upon request. 
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When the agency decision is liberal, the RST group validates at a lower 
rate, and the opposite is true for the SSBG group. The results support 
the realist hypothesis. The validation rate of the RST group appears 
sensitive to the political content of the agency decision and to the 
party of the current president. When stratified by presidential admini-
stration, the validation rate of the SSBG group is always higher than 
that of the RST group. This result poses a challenge for a strong version 
of the realist account. These results are readily apparent in sample means 
and are robust to regression specifications that explain more of the 
variation in the probability of validation. 
C. Liberal and Conservative Voting 
Our analysis has coded cases in terms of the ideological valence 
of the agency’s decisions, which enables us to test the three hypotheses 
with which we began. But it is also possible to produce an aggregated 
data set, simply by coding judicial voting in liberal or conservative 
terms. By this measure, we counted a judicial vote as liberal if it favors 
upholding an agency interpretation against industry challenge or if it 
favors invalidating an agency interpretation against the challenge of a 
public interest group (or labor union). With this aggregate measure, 
we obtain additional support for the qualified realist hypothesis. 
Table 4 presents the rates of liberal voting for the three groups of 
justices. Consistent with standard perceptions of the justices, the 
SSBG group casts liberal votes at higher rates, and the RST group at 
lower rates. The liberal voting rate of the OK group falls between 
them. The most striking finding is a 30 percentage point overall differ-
ence in liberal votes between the SSBG and RST groups. This differ-
ence is statistically significant—as is the 16 percentage point differ-
ence between SSBG and OK. Indeed, the differences between the 
SSBG group and the RST and OK groups are at least 15 percentage 
points and are statistically significant in both Democratic and Repub-
lican administrations. In addition to according with common percep-
tions of the justices, these results provide direct support for the realist 
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TABLE 4 
Liberal Voting Rates of Groups of Supreme Court Justices in  
Chevron Cases: Total and by Party of Current President 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Party of Current President 
Justice 
Total 
(1) 
Democratic 
(2) 
Republican 
(3) 
Difference 
of (2)–(3): 
Stevens, Souter, Breyer & Ginsburg  .670 
(.031) 
[224] 
.730 
(.042) 
[115] 
.606 
(.047) 
[109] 
.125** 
(.063) 
O’Connor & Kennedy  .508 
(.044) 
[132] 
.567 
(.065) 
[60] 
.458 
(.059) 
[72] 
.108 
(.088) 
Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas  .366 
(.035) 
[194] 
.387 
(.051) 
[93] 
.347 
(.048) 
[101] 
.041 
(.070) 
Difference of SSBG–OK  .162** 
(.053) 
.164** 
(.074) 
.147** 
(.075) 
--
Difference of SSBG–RST  .304** 
(.047) 
.343** 
(.065) 
.259** 
(.067) 
--
Difference of OK–RST  .142** 
(.055) 
.180** 
(.082) 
.112 
(.075) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
At the same time, there are noteworthy differences across ad-
ministrations. All three groups of justices show somewhat higher lib-
eral voting rates in Democratic administrations. The increase in liberal 
votes in Democratic administrations is consistent with the view that 
Chevron actually has an effect. If Chevron succeeds in restraining the 
political preferences of the justices, liberals should have lower liberal 
voting rates when the president is Republican because Chevron should 
cause liberals to validate some conservative agency decisions. Simi-
larly, it should cause conservatives to have higher liberal voting rates 
when the president is Democratic because it requires conservatives to 
validate some liberal agency decisions. For both liberal and conserva-
tive justices, liberal voting rates should be higher during Democratic 
presidencies and lower in Republican ones. Table 4 offers some quali-
fied support for this prediction. For the SSBG and OK groups, the rate 
of liberal voting rises by more than 10 percentage points when a De-
mocrat is president. In contrast, the increase for the RST group is only 
4 percentage points. These results provide partial support for both the 
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doctrinal and realist hypotheses, though the realist view seems to do 
somewhat better. 
D. Chevron and Non-Chevron Review in the Supreme Court 
The analysis thus far shows that even with the constraint of Chev-
ron’s two-step framework, politics continues to play a role in the judi-
cial review of agency decisions. This influence of politics is, however, 
only a partial answer to the larger question of how Chevron affects ju-
dicial review of agency interpretations. An answer to this broader 
question requires an assessment of whether, in the absence of Chev-
ron, politics would exert a stronger influence in judicial review. Noth-
ing that we have said thus far precludes the possibility that Chevron
has had some equalizing influence.
30 In other words, the significance of 
the findings thus far is difficult to assess because they do not provide a 
baseline of what judicial review would occur in the absence of Chevron.
The ideal baseline for evaluating this broader significance is the 
counterfactual of judicial review without Chevron. We could imagine a 
thought experiment in which courts would divide review of agency 
decisions into two groups. In one group, the court would be required 
to apply Chevron, and in the other, it would be required not to do so. 
The difference in the validation rates between these two groups of 
cases would provide a measure of Chevron’s impact on judicial review. 
Of course, we cannot conduct this ideal experiment. The analysis to 
follow is somewhat complex; the largest lesson is that we find no evi-
dence that Chevron is influencing ideological voting on the Court. 
The justices themselves decide whether and when to apply Chev-
ron. In the jargon of statistics, the application of Chevron is not ex-
ogenous. Rather, its application is, to some degree, an interpretive 
choice of the Court itself. The doctrinal and the realist hypotheses dis-
agree about the extent to which the justices have discretion to exercise 
this choice, and consequently, these accounts make different predic-
tions about the frequency of Chevron application and the pattern of 
validation in non-Chevron cases. A simple realist account assumes that 
justices enjoy wide discretion in deciding whether to apply Chevron
and that they employ Chevron deference strategically. The realist ac-
count predicts that justices will be more inclined to apply Chevron
when they want to uphold agency action, and less inclined to apply 
Chevron when they want to invalidate agency action. In the realist 
account, the rate at which justices vote to apply Chevron should be 
higher when the agency action matches the justice’s ideological pref-
30  For an early discussion, see Schuck and Elliott, 1990 Duke L J at 1057–59 (cited in note 
6) (concluding that Chevron led to an increase in deference to agency decisions). 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 843
erences and lower when it does not match. An unmitigated realist 
view also predicts that legal doctrines, such as Chevron deference, are 
objects for judicial manipulation rather than binding constraints on 
justices’ efforts to implement their preferred policies. Therefore, a re-
alist prediction is that validation rates should correlate with ideologi-
cal preferences, irrespective of whether the Court applies Chevron. In 
cases not involving Chevron deference, judicial behavior should be 
essentially the same. 
In contrast, a simple doctrinal account assumes that the doctrine 
imposes sharp limits on the justices’ ability to refuse to apply Chevron
and that there is nothing like unbounded freedom to apply Chevron as 
the justices see fit. In the doctrinal view, the rate of Chevron applica-
tion should not vary much across individual justices and should not 
correlate with the ideological likings of the justices. Moreover, the 
doctrinalist perceives Chevron itself as a restraint on judicial policy-
making. This view predicts that Chevron, as a doctrine of deference, 
should weaken the correlation between the politics of the agency deci-
sion and the justice’s willingness to validate that decision. In this ac-
count, the justices should more readily vote according to their ideologi-
cal preferences when the Court does not apply Chevron than when it 
does. Ideological voting should be less apparent in Chevron cases than 
non-Chevron cases. 
Our data permit tests of these predictions. Again, the number of 
cases in which the Court reviewed an agency decision but did not ap-
ply Chevron is small—15 cases, representing 120 votes by justices in 
the sample. Our analysis is therefore speculative, but we can advance a 
few tentative conclusions. First, Table 5 reports the rates at which the 
three groups of justices voted to apply Chevron. There is little varia-
tion overall in the rate at which the three groups of justices voted to 
apply Chevron. All three groups voted to apply Chevron more than 
three-fourths of the time, and their rates differ by at most 6 percent-
age points. Moreover, the largest difference in their overall rates of 
voting to apply Chevron arises not in the two most ideologically dis-
tant groups—SSBG and RST—but between the liberals and the mod-
erates—SSBG and OK. These estimates suggest that the discretion of 
the justices to apply Chevron is rather limited.
31
31  See, for example, Barnhart v Walton, 535 US 212, 221–22 (2002); United States v Mead 
Corp, 533 US 218, 231–34 (2001) (holding that a limited class of agency interpretations do not 
merit Chevron deference).  
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TABLE 5 
Supreme Court Justices’ Rates of Voting to Apply Chevron:
By Groups of Justices and by Party of Current President 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Party of Current President 
Justice 
Total 
(1) 
Democratic 
(2) 
Republican 
(3) 
Difference 
of (2)–(3): 
Stevens, Souter, Breyer, & Ginsburg  .813 
(.024) 
[273] 
.831 
(.028) 
[177] 
.781 
(.042) 
[96] 
.049 
(.049) 
O’Connor & Kennedy  .759 
(.034) 
[162] 
.750 
(.044) 
[100] 
.774 
(.054) 
[62] 
-.024 
(.070) 
Rehnquist, Scalia, & Thomas  .783 
(.027) 
[235] 
.757 
(.035) 
[148] 
.828 
(.041) 
[87] 
-.071 
(.056) 
Difference of SSBG–OK  .054 
(.040) 
.081 
(.050) 
.007 
(.068) 
--
Difference of SSBG–RST  .030 
(.036) 
.074 
(.045) 
-.046 
(.059) 
--
Difference of OK–RST  -.024 
(.043) 
-.007 
(.056) 
-.053 
(.066) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding. 
The estimates in Table 5 therefore offer substantial support for 
the doctrinal view, but when the data are decomposed according to 
whether the agency decision was liberal, a modest ideological pattern 
emerges. When the agency decision is liberal, the rate at which the 
SSBG group applies the Chevron framework rises by 5 percentage 
points and that at which the RST group applies it falls by about 7 per-
centage points. The movement in the rate of the OK group is 
smaller—only 2 percentage points. Although none of these differences 
is statistically significant, the direction of the small fluctuations is consis-
tent with the ideological preferences of the justices. The results in Table 
5 suggest that the decision to apply Chevron is ideologically contested 
by the justices. 
Table 6 assesses the more important prediction of the doctrinal 
and realist hypotheses by reporting comparisons of Chevron and non-
Chevron cases according to whether the agency decision was liberal. 
The table consists of three panels, one for each of the three groups of 
justices. It is readily apparent that the justices’ validation rates in Chev-
ron cases are, for the most part, not substantially different from those in 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 845
non-Chevron cases. For the SSBG group, the validation rates in non-
Chevron cases are actually slightly higher than in Chevron cases, but 
the gap is small—at most 6.5 percentage points in cases when the 
agency decision was not liberal. In non-Chevron cases, the frequency 
of the SSBG group’s voting to validate correlates with the political 
content of the agency decision about as closely as it does in Chevron 
cases. In particular, the magnitude of the fluctuation in the SSBG 
group’s validation votes between liberal and nonliberal agency deci-
sions is, at 26.6 and 22.8 percentage points, roughly the same in Chev-
ron and non-Chevron cases.  
Panel III shows an analogous pattern for the RST group. In Chev-
ron cases, the RST group on average votes about 10 percentage points 
more often to validate than in non-Chevron cases, but given the small 
number of observations, this difference is not statistically significant. 
As Table 2 showed, the RST group validates nonliberal agency actions 
under Chevron at a rate more than 30 percentage points higher than 
that of liberal agency actions. Strikingly, Panel III of Table 6 displays a 
similar pattern among non-Chevron cases; there, the RST group votes 
to validate a liberal agency decision about 37 percentage points less often.   
In contrast, the OK group’s validation rate varies little with the 
political content of the agency decision, and as shown in Panel II of 
Table 6, this pattern holds true regardless of whether the Court ap-
plied  Chevron. The most noteworthy difference in the OK group’s 
votes is the overall gap between Chevron and non-Chevron cases in the 
rate of validation. The overall rate of validation by these justices is 
about 30 percentage points higher in Chevron than non-Chevron cases. 
The OK group therefore exhibits a very different pattern from either 
the SSBG or RST groups. For the OK group, the political content of 
the agency decision matters little in likelihood of validation, but 
whether the Court applies Chevron matters a great deal. For the 
SSBG and RST groups, the political content of the agency decision 
bears a strong relationship to the likelihood of validation, but the ap-
plication of Chevron does not. 
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TABLE 6 
Validation Rates of Supreme Court Justices: By Groups of Justices,  
by Ideological Content of Agency Decision, and by Chevron Status 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
I. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
Type of Analysis 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Court Applied  
Chevron
.848 
(.030) 
[145] 
.582 
(.056) 
[79] 
.266** 
(.058) 
(B) Court Did Not  
Apply Chevron
.875 
(.059) 
[32] 
.647 
(.119) 
[17] 
.228* 
(.119) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  -.027 
(.070) 
-.065 
(.133) 
--
II. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
Type of Analysis 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Court Applied  
Chevron
.646 
(.053) 
[82] 
.720 
(.064) 
[50] 
-.074 
(.085) 
(B) Court Did Not  
Apply Chevron
.389 
(.118) 
[18] 
.333 
(.142) 
[12] 
.056 
(.186) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  .257** 
(.126) 
.387** 
(.148) 
--
III. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
Type of Analysis 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Court Applied  
Chevron
.455 
(.045) 
[123] 
.761 
(.051) 
[71] 
-.305** 
(.071) 
(B) Court Did Not  
Apply Chevron
.320 
(.095) 
[25] 
.688 
(.120) 
[16] 
-.368** 
(.153) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  .135 
(.109) 
.073 
(.121) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 847
In sum, the evidence of Tables 5 and 6 does not provide unquali-
fied support for either the doctrinal or the realist position. Table 6 
shows that the validation rates of the political wings of the Court, the 
SSBG and RST groups, appear as ideological in non-Chevron cases as 
in Chevron cases. This finding is consistent with a simple realist view 
that the Chevron doctrine fails to constrain the political preferences of 
justices. However, Table 6 also reports that the validation rates of the 
SSBG are slightly lower—and those of the RST group are slightly 
higher—in Chevron cases than in non-Chevron cases. The validation 
rate of the OK group in Chevron cases is roughly 30 percentage points 
higher than in non-Chevron cases. Although the sample size is small, a 
doctrinalist might view these latter findings as consistent with Chev-
ron encouraging, if not achieving, convergence in the validation rates 
of the justices. Again, the self-selected application of Chevron means 
that it is hazardous to infer its causal effect on validation rates simply 
by comparing outcomes in Chevron and non-Chevron cases. Table 5 
shows that the frequency of Chevron application is itself difficult to 
interpret. A doctrinalist could contrast the modest ideological patterns 
in the rates of Chevron application with the strong ideological pat-
terns in validation under Chevron and conclude that even ideologi-
cally motivated jurists are unable to escape the application of Chev-
ron. The riposte of the realist is the application of Chevron matters 
little, given that Chevron does not succeed in dampening the ideologi-
cal patterns in validation rates.  
Because of the limited number of cases and because the Court 
has some discretion in deciding whether to apply Chevron, any gener-
alizations must be tentative. But the evidence supports the view that 
among the most ideological justices, Chevron is not associated with 
increased validation of agency interpretations of law. In this respect, 
the data are quite inconsistent with the view, tempting to some doctri-
nalists, that Chevron and other deference doctrines should have a strong 
effect on judicial behavior. On the contrary, any effect of Chevron
seems to be very modest. 
III. COURTS OF APPEALS AND CHEVRON
It might be thought that for present purposes, the Supreme Court 
is unique. The Court decides the most difficult and controversial cases, 
and perhaps it is unsurprising to find that in those cases, political con-
victions matter in the application of the Chevron framework. On the 
courts of appeals, the effect of such convictions might be expected to 
be dampened. We now explore whether our conclusions about the Su-
preme Court’s application of Chevron can be generalized by seeing 
whether the patterns persist in the courts of appeals.  
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A. Data and Method
To isolate agency decisions that were likely to generate politically 
salient issues, attention was restricted to challenges to interpretations 
of law by two important agencies known for producing politically con-
tentious decisions: the EPA and the NLRB. These data were struc-
tured into a file of judge-by-case observations, and we limit our atten-
tion in this analysis to cases in which the courts applied Chevron. The 
data set therefore contains a total of 680 votes—369 by Republican 
appointees and 311 by Democratic appointees. As with the Supreme 
Court, so too here: the coding decisions were simple and crude. We 
employ the same proxies of the ideological content of the agency deci-
sion: whether the decision was liberal or not, and the party of the cur-
rent president.
32
In the Supreme Court, much is known about the individual justices, 
and the data themselves were largely consistent with these assessments. 
By contrast, circuit court judges are vastly greater in number and rela-
tively less well known. To test for the effect of politics, we classified 
those judges according to the party of the president who nominated 
them to the circuit court. For ease of exposition, we refer to these 
judges as “Democratic appointees” or “Republican appointees.”
33
32  We originally collected the relevant data for the EPA, the NLRB, and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), asking a group of research assistants to do the relevant 
coding. After they did their work, we collected the cases anew and recoded them ourselves for 
the EPA and the NLRB. The patterns we found were quite similar to those of the group of re-
search assistants, with variations in the numbers but no substantial changes in the basic patterns. 
We also attempted to recode the FCC cases, but found the enterprise extremely difficult, in large 
part because of the number of parties and issues, and the consequent difficulty of characterizing 
FCC decisions in ideological terms. As a result of that difficulty, we dropped the FCC data from 
our analysis. Interestingly, however, the group of research assistants found patterns for the FCC 
that were entirely consistent with the basic patterns for the EPA and the NLRB—with validation 
rates that did not vary between Republican and Democratic appointees, but with voting patterns 
that showed an effect of ideology (higher validation rates by Republican appointees for Republican 
than Democratic administrations, and for conservative than liberal agency decisions, and the opposite 
patterns for Democratic appointees). The numbers here are available from the authors on request. 
33  It is tempting and plausible to object to any claim that Republican appointees are “con-
servative” and that Democratic appointees are “liberal.” But for purposes of analysis, it is not 
easy to develop simple, readily available alternatives for classifying judges. (Some efforts in this 
vein have been made. See generally, for example, Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: 
Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L J 1759 (2005).) 
To the extent that our coding scheme misclassifies conservative judges as liberals and vice versa, 
these errors will reduce the likelihood that we detect differences in deference rates of the two 
groups. As we discern some patterns with this coding scheme, the error of misclassification is 
likely not too severe. 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 849
B. Summary Statistics 
Tables 7 and 8 display summary statistics on the validation rates 
in circuit courts, overall and stratified by the two measures of the ideo-
logical content of the agency decision. Column (1) of Table 7 reports 
the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees. 
We can readily see that the overall average validation rate of the cir-
cuit judges in Chevron cases, at about 64 percent, is roughly similar to 
that of the Supreme Court justices, which averaged 67 percent. Inter-
estingly, the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican 
appointees to the circuit courts are quite similar. The validation rate of 
the average Democratic appointee is higher than that of the average 
Republican appointee by only 0.03 of a percentage point, which is an 
insignificant difference.  
TABLE 7 
Validation Rates of Circuit Court Judges by  
Party of Appointing President in Chevron Cases:  
Total and by Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
Party of Appointing  
President 
Total 
(1) 
Liberal 
(2) 
Not Liberal 
(3) 
Difference of 
(2)–(3): 
(A) Democratic  .640 
(.027) 
[311] 
.739 
(.033) 
[176] 
.511 
(.043) 
[135] 
.228** 
(.054) 
(B) Republican  .637 
(.025) 
[369] 
.595 
(.033) 
[220] 
.698 
(.038) 
[149] 
-.103** 
(.051) 
Difference of (A)–(B)  .003 
(.037) 
.143** 
(.048) 
-.187** 
(.057) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
The next columns of Table 7 break out the validation rates by 
whether the agency decision is liberal or not. These decompositions show 
that the overall validation rates mask significant correlations between the 
political party of the appointing president and the ideological content 
of the agency decision. When the agency decision is liberal, the valida-
tion rates of Democratic appointees are almost 23 percentage points 
higher, and those of Republican appointees are more than 10 percentage 
points lower. Although the Democratic appointees appear somewhat 
more responsive to the political content of the case, the difference 
across the two types of judges (that is, 12.5 = 22.8 – 10.3) is not so 
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great that it permits a conclusion that the validation rates of judges of 
one party fluctuate by more—in a statistical sense—than those of 
judges of the other party. Instead, the validation rates of all circuit 
judges display an almost seesawing pattern according to the identity 
of the challenging party.  
A notable difference between the patterns observed here and 
those among the Supreme Court justices is that the magnitude of the 
fluctuation in the validation rates between liberal and nonliberal agency 
decisions is about 10 percentage points lower among the circuit court 
judges. The validation rates in cases involving liberal agency actions 
appear to account for most of this difference. The validation rates of 
Democratic appointees in cases with liberal agency decisions do not 
rise as high as those of the SSBG group, and the validation rates of 
Republican appointees in these cases do not fall as low as those of the 
RST group. The less prominent ideological pattern in the circuit court 
data may be due to our less precise measures of the judicial ideology 
of circuit court judges. The use of the political party of the nominating 
president is an imperfect measure because some conservative judges 
were nominated by Democratic presidents, just as some liberal judges 
were nominated by Republican presidents. Even with this crude meas-
ure, these results provide further support for the realist hypothesis. 
TABLE 8 
Validation Rates of Circuit Court Judges by Party of  
Appointing and by Current President in Chevron Cases 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Party of Current President 
Party of Appointing  
President 
Total 
(1) 
Democratic 
(2) 
Republican 
(3) 
Difference of 
(2)–(3): 
(A) Democratic  .640 
(.027) 
[311] 
.698 
(.043) 
[116] 
.605 
(.035) 
[195] 
.093* 
(.056) 
(B) Republican  .637 
(.025) 
[369] 
.592 
(.038) 
[169] 
.675 
(.033) 
[200] 
-.083* 
(.050) 
Difference of (A)–(B)  .003 
(.037) 
.107* 
(.058) 
-.070 
(.048) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference signifi-
cant at 5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
Table 8 reports validation rates when the party of the current 
president is the proxy for the ideological content of the agency deci-
sion. The pattern for Republican nominees here is similar to that in 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 851
the prior table, but the validation rates of Democratic nominees ex-
hibit less movement here—about 9 percentage points rather than the 
23 percentage points shown in Table 7. As was seen with the Supreme 
Court justices, the party of the current president is probably a less ac-
curate measure of the ideological content of an agency decision. Al-
though the amplitude of the fluctuations is reduced here, the seesaw-
ing pattern that is consistent with the realist hypothesis persists.  
In sum, the results for the circuit courts, like those for the Supreme 
Court, provide strong evidence that the political predispositions of the 
judges influence the judicial review of agency interpretations.
34 Overall, 
Democratic appointees validate at roughly the same rate as the Re-
publican appointees. These overall figures obscure correlations be-
tween a judge’s political party and the ideological content of the 
agency interpretations. When the cases are classified according to 
whether the agency decision is liberal, the validation rates of both Re-
publican and Democratic appointees exhibit a strong seesawing pattern, 
with validation rates of the judges of each party rising when the content 
of the agency decision is closer to their political preference.  
When the data are decomposed by the party of the current presi-
dent, a similar but less pronounced pattern is apparent. When a De-
mocrat rather than a Republican occupies the presidency, the valida-
tion rates of Republican appointees fall by about 8 percentage points 
and those of Democratic appointees rise by about 9 percentage points. 
Therefore, when a Democrat is president, the validation rates of Re-
publican appointees are on average lower than those of Democratic 
appointees, and when a Republican is president the opposite is true. 
The results for circuit court judges thus provide support for the realist 
model, but as with the Supreme Court justices, it is far from a com-
plete explanation, simply because judicial politics cannot account for 
all of the patterns that we observe.  
C. Chevron Review in Circuit Courts: The Power of Panels 
Across a range of legal issues in which ideology is expected to 
play a role, a federal circuit judge has been found to be more likely to 
vote in a predictably ideological way when sitting on a panel with two 
judges appointed by a president of the same political party.
35 For con-
34  Again, we used regression analysis to examine the robustness of these patterns to other 
factors potentially bearing on the likelihood that a judge votes to defer. We forgo discussion of 
those estimates here, except to say that the patterns apparent in the summary statistics are ro-
bust to controlling for the dates, the circuit court, and type of agency involved in the case. 
35  See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on 
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va L Rev 301, 305, 316–29 (2004) 
(noting that “Democratic appointees, sitting with two Democratic appointees, are about twice as 
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venience, we refer to these correlations between politicized voting and 
panel composition as “panel effects.” 
This subsection examines the latter mechanism more fully. Focus-
ing on the data from the courts of appeals, we test whether panel ef-
fects persist in cases where a circuit court applied Chevron.
36 The most 
important lesson is that both Democratic and Republican appointees 
show far more political voting patterns when they are sitting on uni-
fied panels. When the panels are divided, the role of politics is greatly 
dampened.  
FIGURE 1 
Validation Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases, by  
Agency and by Party of Appointing President 
Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the 
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees. 
likely to vote in the stereotypically liberal fashion as are Republican appointees, sitting with two 
Republican appointees”).
36  The analysis differs from that of Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev 301 (cited 
in note 35), in several important respects. The earlier analysis examined the role of panel compo-
sition in cases involving controversial issues that were “especially likely to reveal divisions be-
tween Republican and Democratic appointees,” such as affirmative action and campaign finance. 
Id at 304. In contrast, Chevron is intended to reduce, even minimize, divisions between Republi-
can and Democratic appointees. Although the Sunstein et al study examined EPA cases, it con-
sidered only an expanded version of Richard Revesz’s sample of EPA cases from the D.C. Cir-
cuit. See id at 322–23, 345–47 (discussing the sample used); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717 (1997) (examining the impact of 
judges’ ideology on judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit in environmental cases). The cur-
rent data includes EPA—as well as NLRB and FCC cases—from all circuits. 
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Figures 1 and 2 present basic facts about validation rates. Figure 1 
shows validation rates by the agency and by the party of the judge’s 
appointing president. When the judges’ votes are not decomposed by 
political affiliation, the overall validation rates by agency vary rela-
tively little: for the EPA and NLRB, those rates are 61.7 percent and 
70.1 percent, respectively. Figure 1 also shows small differences across 
the party of the judge’s appointing president within each type of case. 
These modest differences are consistent with the near equivalence in the 
validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees overall in Ta-
ble 7. The validation rates of Republican and Democratic appointees 
in EPA cases differ by less than 2 percentage points, though  in NLRB 
cases, Democratic appointees validate at a rate nearly 9 percentage 
points higher than Republican appointees.  
FIGURE 2 
Validation Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases,  
by Panel Composition and by Party of Appointing President 
Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the 
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees. 
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These patterns conform to general impressions of the conten-
tiousness of the issues confronting these agencies. The NLRB has the 
wider validation gap between judges of different political parties, and 
labor-management relations are traditionally a subject in which views 
align along the conventional left-right spectrum. Environmental issues 
may be slightly less polarizing. Consistent with this impression, the vali-
dation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees are nearly 
identical in EPA cases.  
Figure 2 displays the validation rates of court of appeals judges 
by the political composition of the appellate panel. This figure pools 
the cases pertaining to all three agencies. Two patterns are striking. 
First, a moderate panel effect characterizes Democratic appointees. 
When sitting with either one or two Republican appointees, a Democ-
ratic appointee validates about 61 percent of the time. Moreover, in 
that circumstance, the validation rate of the Democratic appointee is 
indistinguishable from that of her Republican colleagues. But when 
sitting with two other Democrats, the average validation rate of a 
Democratic appointee jumps by more than 12 percentage points. Prior 
research established that across a broad range of issues, ideological 
voting increases with the addition of any like-minded judge to a panel.
37
In this sample of Chevron cases, strong ideological patterns in voting 
emerge only when all three judges on a panel belong to the same party.
38
Second, the overall validation rates of Republican appointees ap-
pear nearly invariant to panel composition. Their validation rates range 
from about 61 percent to 67 percent—a movement of only 6 percentage 
points. These estimates contrast with earlier findings that, for judges of 
both political parties, the frequency with which they voted in stereo-
typically ideological ways correlated with the composition of the panel.
39
As with several of the Supreme Court justices, stability in overall 
validation rates could mask substantial variation in validation when 
the ideological content of the agency decision is examined. Therefore, 
the validation rates were further decomposed by our two proxies for 
the political content of the agency decision. Tables 9 and 10 present 
these decompositions. In Table 9, the cases were classified according to 
whether the agency decision was liberal, and in Table 10, they were 
37  See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316–29 (cited in note 35) (showing 
that party and panel influences on the votes of individual judges obtain in a number of issue areas). 
38  In the overall deference rates displayed in Figure 2, this pattern is apparent only for 
Democratic appointees. But when the data are also stratified by political content of the agency 
decision, as in Tables 9 and 10, this pattern characterizes Republican appointees as well. 
39  See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316–29 (cited in note 35) (demon-
strating that the rates of ideological votes by Republican judges differed by 14 percentage points, 
depending on the composition of the panel).2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 855
classified according to whether the current president was a Democrat 
or Republican. The results are remarkably consistent across these two 
classifications, and here the role of panel effects becomes more striking. 
TABLE 9 
Validation Rates in Chevron Cases by Party of Appointing President, 
by Ideological Content of Agency Decision, and by Panel Composition 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
      Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
Party of Appointing 
President 
Panel  
Composition  Total 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Democratic  DDD  .742 
(.054) 
[66] 
.857 
(.055) 
[42] 
.542 
(.104) 
[24] 
.315** 
(.107) 
(B) Democratic  DDR or 
RRD 
.612 
(.031) 
[245] 
.701 
(.040) 
[134] 
.505 
(.048) 
[111] 
.197** 
(.062) 
(C) Republican  DDR or 
RRD 
.622 
(.031) 
[249] 
.647 
(.041) 
[139] 
.591 
(.047) 
[110] 
.057 
(.062) 
(D) Republican  RRR  .667 
(.043) 
[120] 
.506 
(.056) 
[81] 
1.000 
(.000) 
[39] 
-.494** 
(.081) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  --  .130* 
(.066) 
.156** 
(.077) 
.037 
(.113) 
--
Difference of (A)–(C):  --  .112* 
(.066) 
.210** 
(.080) 
-.049 
(.112) 
--
Difference of (A)–(D):  --  .076 
(.071) 
.351** 
(.087) 
-.458** 
(.081) 
--
Difference of (B)–(C):  --  -.010 
(.044) 
.054 
(.057) 
-.086 
(.067) 
--
Difference of (B)–(D):  --  -.054 
(.054) 
.195** 
(.067) 
-.495** 
(.081) 
--
Difference of (C)–(D):  --  -.044 
(.054) 
.141** 
(.068) 
-.409** 
(.079) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
In Table 9, the validation rates of Democrats who sit on panels 
with two other Democratic appointees are nearly a mirror image of  
those of Republican appointees who sit on panels with two other Re-
publican appointees. These fine decompositions of the sample reduce 
the number of observations and make it difficult to make firm infer-
ences about magnitudes, but strong patterns emerge. Here is the most 
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striking finding: a Democratic appointee sitting with two Democratic 
appointees votes to uphold a liberal decision more than 30 percentage 
points more often than a conservative one—and a Republican ap-
pointee sitting with two Republican appointees votes to uphold a con-
servative decision more than 30 percentage points more often than a 
liberal one. For both Republican and Democratic appointees, the vali-
dation rates rise from about 50 percent when the judge’s party affilia-
tion does not match the political content of the agency decision to 
over 80 percent when it does match. 
When judges sit on panels with at least one judge of the other 
party, the political content of the agency decision appears to induce 
much less fluctuation in the validation rates. A Democratic appointee 
sitting on a panel with either one or two Republican appointees is 
about 20 percentage points more likely to vote to validate when the 
agency decision is liberal. A Republican appointee sitting on a panel 
with either one or two Democratic appointees is only about 6 per-
centage points less likely to vote to validate when the agency decision 
is liberal. Politically mixed panels therefore dampen the size of ideo-
logical fluctuations in validation rates.  
Table 10 presents analogous calculations when the cases are or-
ganized by the party of the current president. The patterns here are 
similar and in a way stunning. A Democratic appointee sitting with 
two other Democrats votes to validate about 30 percentage points less 
often when the president is a Republican than when he is a Democrat. 
A Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees 
votes to validate about 30 percentage points less often when the presi-
dent is a Democrat than when he is Republican.  2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 857
TABLE 10 
Validation Rates in Chevron Cases by Party of Appointing President, 
by Party of Current President, and by Panel Composition 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Party of Current President 
Party of Appointing  
President 
Panel  
Composition 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Democratic  DDD  .952 
(.048) 
[21] 
.644 
(.072) 
[45] 
.308** 
(.111) 
(B) Democratic  DDR or 
RRD
.642 
(.049) 
[95] 
.593 
(.040) 
[150] 
.049 
(.064) 
(C) Republican  DDR or 
RRD
.632 
(.047) 
[106] 
.615 
(.041) 
[143] 
.017 
(.062) 
(D) Republican  RRR  .524 
(.063) 
[63] 
.825 
(.051) 
[57] 
-.301** 
(.082) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  --  .310** 
(.108) 
.051 
(.083) 
--
Difference of (A)–(C):  --  .320** 
(.108) 
.029 
(.083) 
--
Difference of (A)–(D):  --  .429** 
(.114) 
-.180** 
(.086) 
--
Difference of (B)–(C):  --  .010 
(.068) 
-.022 
(.057) 
--
Difference of (B)–(D):  --  .118 
(.080) 
-.231** 
(.072) 
--
Difference of (C)–(D):  --  .108 
(.078) 
-.209** 
(.072) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
The first column of Table 9 shows that for judges sitting on mixed 
panels, the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican ap-
pointees are nearly identical—61 and 62 percent, respectively. The 
patterns are less clear, however, when the validation rates of Democ-
ratic and Republican appointees sitting on mixed panels are further 
broken out by the measures for the ideological content of the agency 
decision. Table 9 shows that especially for Democratic appointees, the 
validation rates of judges sitting on politically mixed panels exhibit 
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some sensitivity to the political content of the agency decision. De-
mocratic appointees sitting on mixed panels vote to validate about 20 
percentage points more often when the agency decision is liberal 
rather than conservative, but this difference is still less than that of 
Democratic appointees sitting with two other Democratic appointees. 
Republican appointees sitting on mixed panels vote to validate 
nonliberal agency decisions about 6 percentage points more often 
than liberal ones. In contrast, Table 10 reports that the validation rates of 
Democratic and Republican appointees sitting on mixed panels appear 
invariant to the party of the current president. These results indicate 
that the pattern of ideological voting by judges sitting on politically 
unified panels is robust to either measure of the political content of 
the agency decision. In contrast, the pattern of ideological voting by 
judges sitting on politically mixed panels appears muted in Table 9 and 
disappears altogether in Table 10.
40
These estimates show that, consistent with prior research, panel 
composition has a sizable effect on judicial voting patterns. But the in-
fluence of panel composition has a somewhat more limited effect in 
Chevron cases than it does in the consideration of other legal issues. 
Prior research showed that for many ideologically contentious issues, 
panel composition influenced the likelihood that judges vote in pre-
dictably ideological ways, even when the panels were a mix of Repub-
licans and Democrats.
41 In contrast, when a court applies Chevron’s 
two-step framework, ideological tendencies in overall deference rates 
appear restricted to appellate panels composed of three judges from 
the same political party. The addition of even just one judge from the 
other political party renders overall validation rates of Democratic and 
Republican appointees nearly indistinguishable. Whether it also elimi-
nates fluctuation in validation rates across the political content of 
agency decisions for judges sitting on politically mixed panels is un-
clear; these estimates are sensitive to which measure of political con-
tent is used.  
These estimates suggest that most of the difference in the valida-
tion rates of Republican and Democratic appointees arises from pan-
els consisting exclusively of judges from one political party. For politi-
cally mixed panels, the validation rates of Democratic and Republican 
judges are very similar to each other; all but one of the differences are 
10 percentage points or less and are statistically insignificant. The only 
40  The regression analysis was used to verify the robustness of the patterns reported in 
Tables 7 through 10 to the control variables already discussed in note 34. We forgo reporting 
those results in detail, except to express our confidence that the patterns we discuss here persist 
after controlling for those other factors. 
41  See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316–29 (cited in note 35). 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 859
exception to this pattern is that a Democratic judge on a politically 
mixed panel has a validation rate 20 percentage points higher when 
the agency decision is liberal rather than conservative. Even this dif-
ference, however, appears modest when compared to the differences 
of more than 30 percentage points for politically unified panels. It fol-
lows that when a circuit court applies Chevron, the influence of panel 
composition on judicial decisionmaking appears largely cabined to po-
litically unified panels. These patterns suggest the possibility that Chev-
ron is succeeding in eliminating the influence of circuit judges’ politi-
cal preferences in review of agency decisions, at least within the do-
main of politically mixed panels.  
D. Liberal and Conservative Voting 
As with the Supreme Court, we reclassified the data in terms of 
liberal and conservative voting, and similar patterns emerged, perhaps 
in even more striking form. 
TABLE 11 
Liberal Vote Rates of Circuit Court Appointees by Party  
of Appointing President and by Current President in Chevron Cases 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
    Party of Current President 
Party of Appointing 
President 
Total 
(1) 
Democratic 
(2) 
Republican 
(3) 
Difference of 
(2)–(3): 
(A) Democratic  .672 
(.027) 
[311] 
.716 
(.042) 
[116] 
.646 
(.034) 
[195] 
.069 
(.055) 
(B) Republican  .499 
(.026) 
[369] 
.473 
(.039) 
[169] 
.520 
(.035) 
[200] 
-.047 
(.052) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  .173** 
(.037) 
.242** 
(.058) 
.126** 
(.049) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
Table 11 presents rates of liberal voting for Democratic and Re-
publican appointees overall and by the party of the current president. 
Column (1) of Table 11 shows that, consistent with expectations, De-
mocratic appointees are 17 percentage points more likely to offer a lib-
eral vote in Chevron cases, and this difference is statistically significant.  
The remaining columns of Table 11 show that the rates of liberal 
voting vary modestly with political control of the White House. De-
mocratic appointees are about 7 percentage points more likely to vote 
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in a liberal way when a Democrat holds the presidency, and Republi-
cans are about 5 percentage points less likely to vote in a liberal way 
when a Republican serves as president. These differences imply that 
when a Democrat is president, the average Democratic appointee votes 
in a liberal way about 24 percentage points more often than the aver-
age Republican appointee does. But even during a Republican presi-
dency, the higher rate of liberal voting by Democratic appointees—by 
nearly 13 percentage points—is statistically different from the rate of 
liberal voting of Republican appointees. 
FIGURE 3 
Liberal Voting Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases,  
by Panel Composition and by Party of Appointing President 
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the 
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.
Figure 3 examines liberal voting rates of circuit judges in Chevron
cases by the political composition of the appellate panel. In contrast to 
the validation rates shown in Figure 2, a strong panel effect character-
izes both Democratic and Republican appointees. Although some of 
the differences are modest, both Republican and Democratic appoint-2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 861
ees are more likely to vote in a liberal way as the number of Democ-
ratic appointees on the panel rises. This increase in rates of liberal vot-
ing occurs across all panels and, unlike the pattern seen in the valida-
tion rates, is not limited to the panels comprised only of Democratic 
appointees.  
Even in the presence of these panel effects, Democratic appoint-
ees appear more liberal than their Republican counterparts sitting on 
similarly constituted panels. Even in the politically mixed panels that 
featured similar validation rates by Democratic and Republican ap-
pointees, sizable differences in liberal voting rates are present. The dif-
ference in the liberal voting rate between Democratic appointees sit-
ting with one Democratic and one Republican appointee (66.5 per-
cent), and that of Republican appointees also sitting with one Democ-
ratic and one Republican appointee (55.3 percent) is statistically dif-
ferent from zero. For every combination of panel colleagues, the De-
mocratic appointee is more likely to cast a liberal vote than a Repub-
lican appointee is by at least 10 percentage points, and each of these 
differences is statistically different from zero.  
Table 12 decomposes the rates of liberal voting by the political 
makeup of the appellate panel and by the party of the current presi-
dent. Consistent with previous tables, the voting patterns of politically 
unified panels account for much of the difference in the aggregate 
liberal voting rates of Democratic and Republican appointees. As re-
ported in column (1) of Table 12, a Democratic appointee sitting with 
two other Democratic appointees on average votes in the liberal way 
17 percentage points more often than when she sits with at least one 
Republican. For Republican appointees, this pattern is reversed. A 
Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees 
on average votes in the liberal way 17 percentage points less often 
than when she sits with least one Democrat. Here is the most striking 
finding: there is a gap of about 40 percentage points in liberal voting 
rates between the votes of Democratic appointees on exclusively De-
mocratic panels and those of Republican appointees on exclusively Re-
publican panels.
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TABLE 12 
Liberal Voting Rates in Chevron Cases by Party of Appointing  
President, by Party of Current President, and by Panel Composition 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
      Party of Current President 
Party of Appointing 
President 
Panel  
Composition 
Total 
(1) 
Democratic 
(2) 
Republican 
(3) 
Difference 
of (2)–(3): 
(A) Democratic  DDD  .803 
(.049) 
[66] 
.762 
(.095) 
[21] 
.822 
(.058) 
[45] 
-.060 
(.106) 
(B) Democratic  DDR or 
RRD
.637 
(.031) 
[245] 
.705 
(.047) 
[95] 
.593 
(.040) 
[150] 
.112** 
(.063) 
(C) Republican  DDR or 
RRD
.554 
(.032) 
[249] 
.585 
(.048) 
[106] 
.531 
(.042) 
[143] 
.053 
(.064) 
(D) Republican  RRR  .383 
(.045) 
[120] 
.286 
(.057) 
[63] 
.491 
(.067) 
[57] 
-.206** 
(.088) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  --  .166** 
(.065) 
.057 
(.110) 
.229** 
(.080) 
--
Difference of (A)–(C):  --  .249** 
(.067) 
.117 
(.116) 
.291** 
(.081) 
--
Difference of (A)–(D):  --  .420** 
(.070) 
.476** 
(.114) 
.331** 
(.091) 
--
Difference of (B)–(C):  --  .082* 
(.044) 
.120** 
(.068) 
.062 
(.058) 
--
Difference of (B)–(D):  --  .253** 
(.054) 
.419** 
(.074) 
.102 
(.077) 
--
Difference of (C)–(D):  --  .171** 
(.058) 
.229** 
(.076) 
.040 
(.079) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
The rest of Table 12 indicates that, after controlling for the com-
position of the appellate panel, the party of the current president cor-
relates inconsistently with liberal voting rates. The liberal voting rates 
of Republican appointees sitting on politically unified panels correlate 
strongly with the party of the current president, but the liberal voting 
rates of Democratic appointees sitting on politically unified panels do 
not. For a Republican appointee on a politically mixed panel, a change 
in the party of the presidency implies a movement in the rate of lib-2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 863
eral voting of about 5 percentage points. For a Democratic appointee on 
a politically mixed panel, this fluctuation is about 11 percentage points.  
E. Mixed Panels and Unified Panels Once More 
We have found that judges show much more ideological voting 
on politically unified panels, and that this pattern explains many of the 
ideological tendencies observed in the aggregate data. But the com-
parisons across panels establish four specific findings that are worth 
underlining here. First, the composition of appellate panels has a much 
greater effect on rates of liberal voting than on rates of votes to vali-
date. This distinction is clear in a comparison of Figure 2 to Figure 3, 
as well as Tables 9 and 10 to Table 12.   
Second, when ideological voting appears, it is concentrated in po-
litically unified panels. In Tables 9 and 10, the validation rates of Re-
publican appointees sitting on politically mixed panels are insensitive 
to either measure of the ideological content of the agency action. On 
mixed panels, then, Republican appointees simply do not show ideo-
logical voting. The pattern is not consistent for Democratic appointees. 
When our coding of the ideological content of the agency decision is 
used, Democratic appointees show a degree of ideological voting on 
mixed panels; when the party of the current administration is used, 
Democratic appointees show no such tendency. But when a political 
appointee of either party sits on a politically unified panel, her rate of 
liberal voting exhibits a strong ideological tendency.  
Third, the panel effects on liberal voting rates are generally well 
ordered, in the sense that the patterns are in line with those observed 
in many areas of the law.
42 An exception is the behavior of Republican 
appointees on panels including one or instead two Democratic ap-
pointees. Usually judges show a “collegial concurrence,” in accordance 
with which Republican appointees display relatively liberal voting pat-
terns when sitting with two Democratic appointees, and Democratic 
appointees display fairly conservative voting patterns when sitting 
with two Republican appointees.
43 And indeed this is the pattern we 
observe in Figure 4 for Democratic appointees in EPA cases and Re-
publican appointees in NLRB cases. But in the data as a whole, and in 
EPA cases, Republican appointees show the same rate of liberal vot-
ing regardless of whether they are sitting with one or two Democratic 
appointees.   
42   See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316–18 (cited in note 35). 
43   See id. 
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FIGURE 4 
Liberal Voting Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases,  
by Panel Composition, Agency, and Party of Appointing President 
Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the 
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees. 
Similarly, Democratic appointees in NLRB cases show nearly the 
same rate of liberal voting regardless of whether they sit with one or 
two Republican appointees. The most obvious explanation for this 
unusual finding is that Republican appointees in EPA cases and De-
mocratic appointees in NLRB cases have strong convictions, so that 
they are willing to dissent from two colleagues from the other party. 
Note, however, that the behavior of appointees in general is hardly im-
pervious to panel influences; there is a very large difference between 
their voting patterns on unified and mixed panels. 
Fourth, the partisan composition of the panel seems to have little 
influence on the overall rate of validation for both Democratic and 
Republican appointees. But this appearance obscures stronger ideo-
logical patterns that emerge in finer decompositions of the data. In 
particular, when validation rates are broken out by the political con-
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tent of the agency decision, panel composition appears to have a strong 
influence on the degree of ideological voting. In Figure 2, the overall 
validation rates of Republican appointees change little with the com-
position of the panel, and those of Democratic appointees move only 
slightly, except when they sit on a politically unified panel. Yet when 
the political content of the agency decision is considered, as in Tables 
9 and 12, the validation rates of unified panels show strong ideological 
propensities. The pattern is analogous to Table 7, where similar overall 
rates of validation by Republican and Democratic appointees masked 
pronounced ideological voting that became apparent when the data 
were stratified according to the political content of the agency decision.  
If this admittedly complex evidence is taken as a whole, it does 
show that ideological voting is dampened, even if not eliminated, on 
politically mixed panels. Although the data do not establish that Chev-
ron itself is responsible for this compression in ideological voting in 
validation rates, they do raise this as a serious possibility. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Of Interpretation and Policymaking 
What are the implications of these findings? At first glance, the 
evidence seems to fortify the argument for a strong reading of Chev-
ron. There is no reason to think that where statutes are ambiguous, 
their meaning should depend on the composition of the panel that 
litigants draw, or on the ideological predilections of the sitting judges. 
If the resolution of statutory ambiguities turns on judgments of policy, 
then those judgments ought to be made by the relevant agencies, not 
by federal courts. 
To understand this claim, it is important to return to the rationale 
of Chevron itself. Strikingly, the Court did not justify its two-step in-
quiry by reference to the language or history of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Instead the Court referred to two pragmatic points: 
judges lack expertise and they are not politically accountable. In in-
terpreting law, the agency may “properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Execu-
tive is.”
44 In the Court’s view, it would be appropriate for agencies oper-
ating under the Chief Executive, rather than judges, to resolve “compet-
ing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, 
or intentionally left to be resolved . . . in light of everyday realities.”
45
44 Chevron, 467 US at 865. 
45 Id  at  865–66. 
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What is most striking about this passage is the explicit suggestion that 
resolution of statutory ambiguities requires a judgment about resolv-
ing “competing interests.”  
Building on these ideas, the most forceful defenses of Chevron
have insisted on two points. The first is that the resolution of statutory 
ambiguities calls for a judgment of policy—one that should be made 
by executive officials rather than by judges.
46 The judgment of policy 
might be informed by technical expertise, as, for example, when the 
agency is entrusted with applying its specialized competence to dis-
puted areas. Alternatively, the judgment might be purely normative, as, 
for example, in the view that in the face of uncertainty, statutes should 
be construed so as to fit with the outcome of cost-benefit analysis
47 or 
to protect public health.
48 Whether specialized competence or judg-
ments of value are involved, agencies have a strong comparative ad-
vantage over courts, and deference is therefore the appropriate rule.
The second point is that the Supreme Court should adopt rules of 
deference that counteract the potential balkanization of federal law. 
This problem is likely to emerge if different courts of appeals, with their 
different predilections, approach agency interpretations in an inde-
pendent fashion.
49 In the abstract, Chevron should reduce the risk of 
balkanization simply because judges have been instructed to defer to 
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous terms. And indeed an obvi-
ous defense of Chevron’s deference principle is that it decreases the 
risk that similarly situated litigants will produce different substantive 
law merely because of policy disagreements among lower court judges.  
How does the evidence explored here bear on these questions? 
At first glance, it emphatically supports the view that resolution of am-
biguities often calls for judgments of policy. The difference between 
Republican and Democratic appointees is simply not explicable in 
46  See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles 
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 Vill Envir L J 1, 14 (2005) (“[I]t is 
neither a legislative nor judicial function, but rather an executive function for an agency, acting 
under presidential supervision, to answer statutory questions left open by Congress.”). 
47  See Executive Order 12291, 3 CFR § 2(c)–(d) (1981) (ordering that “[r]egulatory objec-
tives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society” and that “[a]mong alternative 
approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to soci-
ety shall be chosen”). 
48  This is one reading of the FDA’s judgment in FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp, 529 US 120 (2000) (invalidating FDA regulations of tobacco promulgated after the FDA 
determined that nicotine was a “drug” under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). “The agency 
believed that, because most tobacco consumers begin their use before reaching the age of 18, 
curbing tobacco use by minors could substantially reduce the prevalence of addiction in future 
generations and thus the incidence of tobacco-related death and disease.” Id at 125.
49  See Strauss, 87 Colum L Rev at 1121–22 (cited in note 8) (arguing that Chevron prevents 
balkanization by directing that ambiguous statutes be interpreted by one agency rather than 
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other terms. Within the Supreme Court, Chevron may or may not have 
reduced the role of policy disagreement in judicial review of agency 
interpretations of law. Unfortunately, its success on that count has 
been at best partial, both within the Supreme Court and among the 
lower courts. For this reason, it appears that federal judges have not 
taken Chevron seriously enough.  
At the same time, there is a continuing risk of balkanization of 
federal law, if only because different panels will predictably arrive at 
different results on the same questions, which by hypothesis involve 
judgments of policy rather than law.
50 In the abstract, those questions 
should be answered by those with technical expertise or political ac-
countability. They should not be answered by federal judges. In short, 
the evidence seems to suggest the need for courts to adhere more 
closely to the Chevron framework, so as to reduce the risk that regula-
tory law will reflect the preferences of the relevant panel. 
The evidence explored here also has jurisprudential implications. 
Consider, for example, Ronald Dworkin’s influential account of law as 
“integrity.”
51 Dworkin contends that interpretation, including statutory 
interpretation,
52 requires a judgment about “fit” with existing materials 
and about “justification” of those materials; his conception of law as 
integrity requires judges to put existing materials in their “best con-
structive light.”
53 Where “fit” leaves more than one possibility, judges 
have a degree of discretion. Everyone should agree that the executive, 
no less than the judiciary, has a duty of “fit”; many of the hard cases 
arise when the key question is which interpretation puts the law in its 
“best constructive light.”  
But—and here is a question Dworkin does not ask—why should 
courts be entrusted with the duty to carry out that task? In modern 
government, courts are often less capable on that count than is the 
executive, precisely because of its comparatively greater expertise and 
accountability. In deciding how to understand the Endangered Species 
Act, the Food and Drug Act, and the Clean Air Act, it would be puz-
zling to suggest that courts are in a particularly good position to iden-
tify the “best constructive light.” The suggestion would be especially 
puzzling if it turned out that Republican and Democratic nominees 
50  Of course resolution of some ambiguities does depend on judgments of law. The only 
claim made here, in the spirit of Chevron itself, is that where a statute is genuinely ambiguous, a 
judgment of policy is inevitable. We do not attempt to unpack the complexities of “genuine 
ambiguity” necessary to a full analysis of Chevron Step One. The data presented here strongly 
suggest that policy judgments operate in the real-world operation of that step. 
51  See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap 1986). 
52  See id at 313–54. 
53 See  generally  id.
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systematically differed in their judgments about what the “best con-
structive light” reveals. If statutory interpretation often involves an 
element of policymaking discretion—and the evidence so suggests—
the argument for a strong reading of Chevron is surely strengthened. 
Nothing that we have said resolves the dispute over textualism in 
statutory interpretation. Suppose, plausibly, that some of our results 
are attributable to the fact that some judges follow “plain meaning” 
whereas others do not; suppose, also plausibly, that some of our results 
are driven by different attitudes toward bureaucracies in general. To 
the extent that judges differ on these questions, differences in the ap-
plication of the Chevron framework are inevitable. At a minimum, 
however, we can suggest that to the extent that the differences are 
rooted in political considerations, Chevron would best be implemented 
in a way that dampens the role of those considerations. 
B. Tempting Counterarguments 
1. Of lags and politics. 
An initial response would suggest that the evidence does not, in 
fact, support a decision to give greater discretionary authority to regu-
latory agencies. The response would have two components. First, a 
relatively strong judicial role reduces the power of an incumbent 
president to make many changes in a short period—it helps to stabi-
lize the law. Second, a strong judicial role is not adequately character-
ized as a substitution of judicial judgment for executive judgments. If 
the evidence is taken seriously, then a strong judicial role operates in-
stead to extend the policymaking reach of a previous president. When 
Clinton appointees take a strong hand against executive decisions in 
the Bush Administration, or when Justices Scalia and Thomas take a 
strong hand against the Clinton Administration, the views of an earlier 
president are being given continuing authority. In the abstract, it is not 
clear that this continuing authority is undesirable. 
Insofar as this response emphasizes stability, it is not on strong 
ground, simply because administrative law already ensures a high de-
gree, and perhaps an excessively high degree, of stability. It is both time 
consuming and difficult to make a regulation; often the process takes 
two years or more.
54 To say the least, new presidents cannot immedi-
ately change agency policy as they see fit. The “ossification” of rule-
making is a familiar problem in administrative law.
55 The additional 
54  Consider Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, 
Text, and Cases 731 (Aspen 5th ed 2002). 
55  See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 Duke L J 1385 (1992) (discussing the causes of and potential solutions to the problem 2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 869
delay that comes from the exercise of judicial policymaking author-
ity—by appointees of presidents who are no longer in office—hardly 
seems desirable. Indeed, that delay is a singularly odd way to slow down 
executive decisions, because it depends on the (random) draw of judges 
who are unsympathetic to the incumbent president on policy grounds. 
The response is more interesting insofar as it emphasizes the evi-
dent fact that previous presidents are able to play a role in “freezing” 
executive policy. The evidence clearly shows that presidential appoint-
ments have a continuing effect on regulatory policy insofar as judges 
are sometimes skeptical of the policy initiatives of their successors. 
But why is this desirable? If the Bush Administration is embarking on 
a new policy in the domain of environmental protection or telecom-
munications, does it really make sense to say that it should be 
“checked” by the policy preferences of judicial appointees of Presi-
dent Clinton? Unless the Bush Administration is violating the law or 
acting arbitrarily, an affirmative answer is difficult to defend. To the 
extent that the policy preferences of judicial appointees are driving 
judicial decisions, there seems to be little to say on behalf of the exist-
ing situation. 
2. The inevitability of politics.  
A different response would suggest that whatever the strength of 
the deference rule, political differences will break out on the margin 
along which litigation occurs. Of course Republican appointees and 
Democratic appointees would agree if the rule of deference were ab-
solute—if judges were told that agency interpretations of law must be 
upheld under all circumstances. But so long as there is some room for 
review, political differences will matter at the point where that review 
occurs. If, for example, the agency must be upheld unless the statute is 
entirely without ambiguity, then litigants will challenge agency action 
only when the statute is (arguably) entirely without ambiguity, and then 
agencies will interpret statutes aggressively in their preferred direc-
tions. In the hard cases that ultimately arise, Democratic appointees 
will disagree with Republican appointees in just the ways that we have 
outlined here.  
This conjecture cannot be ruled out of bounds. Under the current 
version of Chevron, political differences play a substantial role; under 
of “ossification”); Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 9–25 (Har-
vard 1990) (discussing the decline in rulemaking activity by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration and attributing it to “the inertial force of the general political and legal culture 
within which [the] regulatory regime [is] constructed and operated”). 
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a stronger version of Chevron, perhaps the data would look essentially 
identical.  
Suppose that the conjecture is right. Even if so, that stronger ver-
sion would reflect a large-scale allocation of interpretive authority to 
the executive, simply because the executive’s interpretive discretion 
would be increased. In the remaining cases in which that discretion is 
subject to reasonable challenge, any political disagreement between 
the two sets of judges will certainly be tolerable. The broadest point is 
that if courts endorsed a strong view of the agency’s power of interpre-
tation, there would necessarily be a shift in interpretive power from 
courts to the executive, and the rate of political disagreement among 
judges should be reduced even if not eliminated. 
V. CONCLUSION
In its actual application, the Chevron framework shows a large in-
fluence from the political convictions of federal judges. Of course 
judges follow the law. But on the Supreme Court, disagreements about 
the legality of agency interpretations have an uncomfortable political 
component, simply because those disagreements often operate along 
political lines. We have seen that the most conservative members of 
the Court have been significantly more likely to uphold agency deci-
sions under the two Bush Administrations than under the Clinton 
Administration—and that the most liberal members of the Court 
show the opposite tendency. We have also seen that under the Chev-
ron framework, the liberal justices are more likely to uphold liberal 
agency interpretations than conservative ones—and the conservative 
justices show the opposite tendency. 
On the courts of appeals, a rough equivalence in the overall vali-
dation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees obscures dra-
matic differences in their propensities to validate. These differences 
emerge when the political content of agency decisions and the compo-
sition of appellate panels are considered. Democratic appointees are 
more likely to uphold liberal decisions than conservative decisions by 
23 percentage points, and Republican appointees are more likely to 
uphold conservative decisions than liberal decisions by 11 percentage 
points. The differences are still greater and perhaps most disturbing 
when the composition of the panel is also examined. A Democratic ap-
pointee, sitting with two Democratic appointees, is more likely to vote 
to uphold a liberal decision than a conservative one by more than 30 
percentage points—and a Republican appointee, sitting with two Re-2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 871
publican appointees, is more likely to vote to uphold a conservative 
decision than a liberal one by more than 40 percentage points.  
Of course the normative questions are complex and contested, 
and they have been explored only briefly here.
56 But however those 
questions are resolved, the empirical evidence is clear. Notwithstand-
ing Chevron, the political convictions of federal judges are continuing 
to play a large role in judicial review of agency interpretations of law.  
56  For a discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, Yale L J (forthcoming 2006).
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APPENDIX:COMPARING JUSTICES ON THE SUPREME COURT
APPENDIX TABLE 1
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
A.  Justice Stevens
I.  Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .710 
(.055) 
[69] 
.800 
(.107) 
[15] 
-.090 
(.128) 
II.  By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.829 
(.065) 
[35] 
.796 
(.058) 
[49] 
.033 
(.088) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.806 
(.072) 
[31] 
.632 
(.079) 
[38] 
.175 
(.109) 
III.  By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.846 
(.051) 
[52] 
.750 
(.078) 
[32] 
.096 
(.089) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.860 
(.053) 
[43] 
.462 
(.100) 
[26] 
.399** 
(.103) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 873
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
B.  Justice Souter
I.  Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .770 
(.054) 
[61] 
.643 
(.133) 
[14] 
.128 
(.130) 
II.  By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.857 
(.060) 
[35] 
.750 
(.070) 
[40] 
.107 
(.093) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.774 
(.076) 
[31] 
.767 
(.079) 
[30] 
.008 
(.110) 
III.  By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.792 
(.059) 
[48] 
.815 
(.076) 
[27] 
-.023 
(.097) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.821 
(.062) 
[39] 
.682 
(.102) 
[22] 
.139 
(.113) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
C.   Justice Breyer
I.  Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .818 
(.059) 
[44] 
.900 
(.100) 
[10] 
.082 
(.133) 
II.  By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.852 
(.070) 
[27] 
.778 
(.082) 
[27] 
.074 
(.107) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.833 
(.078) 
[24] 
.800 
(.092) 
[20] 
.033 
(.119) 
III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.838 
(.061) 
[37] 
.765 
(.107) 
[17] 
.073 
(.116) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.900 
(.056) 
[30] 
.643 
(.133) 
[14] 
.257** 
(.129) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 875
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
 (Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
D.  Justice Ginsburg
I.  Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .740 
(.063) 
[50] 
.900 
(.100) 
[10] 
-.160 
(.148) 
II.  By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.906 
(.052) 
[32] 
.750 
(.083) 
[28] 
.156 
(.096) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.724 
(.084) 
[29] 
.762 
(.095) 
[21] 
-.038 
(.128) 
III.  By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.850 
(.057) 
[40] 
.800 
(.092) 
[20] 
.050 
(.104) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
0.818 
(.068) 
[33] 
.588 
(.123) 
[17] 
.230* 
(.129) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
E.  Justice O’Connor
I.  Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .677 
(.058) 
[65] 
.333 
(.126) 
[15] 
.344** 
(.136) 
II.  By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.727 
(.079) 
[33] 
.745 
(.064) 
[47] 
-.017 
(.101) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.655 
(.090) 
[29] 
.694 
(.078) 
[36] 
-.039 
(.118) 
III.  By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.714 
(.065) 
[49] 
.774 
(.076) 
[31] 
-.060 
(.102) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.625 
(.078) 
[40] 
.760 
(.087) 
[25] 
-.135 
(.120) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 877
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
F.  Justice Kennedy
I.  Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .672 
(.058) 
[67] 
.400 
(.131) 
[15] 
.272** 
(.137) 
II.  By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.857 
(.060) 
[35] 
.723 
(.066) 
[47] 
.134 
(.092) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.774 
(.076) 
[31] 
.583 
(.083) 
[36] 
.191* 
(.114) 
III.  By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.784 
(.058) 
[51] 
.774 
(.076) 
[31] 
.010 
(.095) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.667 
(.074) 
[42] 
.680 
(.095) 
[25] 
-.013 
(.120) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
G.  Justice Rehnquist
I. Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .638 
(.058) 
[69] 
.462 
(.144) 
[13] 
.176 
(.148) 
II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.800 
(.069) 
[35] 
.787 
(.060) 
[47] 
.013 
(.092) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.516 
(.091) 
[31] 
.737 
(.072) 
[38] 
-.221* 
(.115) 
III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.765 
(.060) 
[51] 
.839 
(.067) 
[31] 
-.074 
(.093) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.558 
(.077) 
[43] 
.769 
(.084) 
[26] 
-.211* 
(.118) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 879
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
H.  Justice Scalia
I.  Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .522 
(.061) 
[69] 
.467 
(.133) 
[15] 
.055 
(.144) 
II.  By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.800 
(.069) 
[35] 
.837 
(.053) 
[49] 
-.037 
(.)
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.419 
(.090) 
[31] 
.605 
(.080) 
[38] 
-.186 
(.121) 
III.  By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.808 
(.055) 
[52] 
.844 
(.065) 
[32] 
-.036 
(.087) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.419 
(.076) 
[43] 
.692 
(.092) 
[26] 
-.273** 
(.121) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
I. Justice Thomas
I. Overall 
 Court  Applied  Chevron?
Type of Vote 
Yes 
(1) 
No
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
Voted to Validate  .536 
(.067) 
[56] 
.462 
(.144) 
[13] 
.074 
(.156) 
II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Vote 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.771 
(.072) 
[35] 
.676 
(.081) 
[34] 
.095 
(.109) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.484 
(.091) 
[31] 
.600 
(.100) 
[25] 
-.116 
(.143) 
III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision 
  Ideological Content of Agency Decision   
Type of Vote 
Liberal 
(1) 
Not Liberal 
(2) 
Difference of  
(1)–(2): 
(A) Voted to Apply 
Chevron
.689 
(.070) 
[45] 
.792 
(.085) 
[24] 
-.103 
(.114) 
(B) Voted to Validate 
When the Court  
Applied Chevron 
.378 
(.081) 
[37] 
.842 
(.086) 
[19] 
-.464** 
(.129) 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.2006] Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 881
APPENDIX TABLE 2
Liberal Voting Rates of Supreme Court Justices:  
by Groups of Justices, by Party of Current President,  
and by Chevron Status  
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,  
and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
I. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Analysis 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Court Applied  
Chevron
.730 
(.042) 
[115] 
.606 
(.047) 
[109] 
.125** 
(.063) 
(B) Court Did Not  
Apply Chevron
.786 
(.114) 
[14] 
.886 
(.055) 
[35] 
-.100 
(.112) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  -.055 
(.126) 
-.280** 
(.089) 
--
II. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Analysis 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Court Applied  
Chevron
.567 
(.065) 
[60] 
.458 
(.059) 
[72] 
.108 
(.088) 
(B) Court Did Not  
Apply Chevron
.375 
(.183) 
[8] 
.636 
(.105) 
[22] 
-.261 
(.206) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  .192 
(.189) 
-.178 
(.122) 
--
III. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas 
  Party of Current President   
Type of Analysis 
Democratic 
(1) 
Republican 
(2) 
Difference of 
(1)–(2): 
(A) Court Applied  
Chevron
.387 
(.051) 
[93] 
.347 
(.048) 
[101] 
.041 
(.070) 
(B) Court Did Not  
Apply Chevron
.167 
(.112) 
[12] 
.414 
(.093) 
[29] 
-.247 
(.162) 
Difference of (A)–(B):  .220 
(.147) 
-.067 
(.102) 
--
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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